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PREFACE
Japanese foreign policy is now in a period of transition.
Shifts in the international system and new political respon-
sibilities bom of the growing Japanese impact on the world
indicate a new role in world politics. The nature of that
role is the subject of this study.
Foreign policy is the product of both a domestic process
of choice and externally defined constraints. During the
post-war period Japan's domestic politics, especially national
party politics, have been closely linked with the resulting
foreign policy. However, Japan's foreign policy has been and
continues to be uniquely bounded by external constraints. The
dynamics of world politics determine the outer limits within
which the domestic foreign policy-making process is carried
out.
As the title suggests this study deals with but one
piece - the external setting - of a larger puzzle, and it is
not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary
Japanese foreign policy picture. The purpose of this study
is to identify important aspects of the Japanese foreign policy
context and on the basis of the emerging patterns, to propose
general statements of the limitations on choice - therefore to
V1H
indicate the effect of the changing international system on
Japanese options for the future. This is done through an
analysis of (I) the nature of the international system, (II)
relations between Japan and the West, (III) relations between
Japan and the major powers in Asia, (IV) the growing impact
of relations between Japan and the developing nations of South
East Asia, and (V) the defense and security problem. Chapter
VI suggests the limits placed on an emerging international
role on the basis of the previous chapters.
1CHAPTER 1
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The use of the international system in foreign policy anal-
ysis is a device intended to make sense out of an often complex
set of forces occurring simultaneously and in many directions.
Although there is danger of attributing a pattern to interna-
tional politics which does not exist, use of the international
system as a frame of reference does make it possible to pro-
pose general statements about the effect of the changes in
international behavior on foreign policy options, in other
words, how foreign policy is bounded by the global political
structure. Nations interact in patterns which can be recog-
nized. These patterns, once understood, can be used to make
general statements of the balance between the inevitable im-
pact of systemic forces and the remaining area of policy choice
This notion of middle-range systems theory is used in the works
of Raymond Aron and Stanley Hoffmann, the latter of whom des-
cribes its usefulness in the following terms.
Systemic analysis is possible only at a cer-
tain level of abstraction, and its usefulness
resides in its capacity to indicate the limits
of determinism and areas of effective free
action.
^
fStanley Hoffmann
,
Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of
American Foreign Policy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1968), p. 12.
2Despite the growing impact of transnational forces states
are the most important units of the international system. In
his study of models of foreign policy analysis, Graham Allison
describes the advantages of the state-centric or classical
model
.
The contribution of the classical model to our
explanation, prediction and analysis of foreign
affairs is considerable. This lens reduces the
organization and political complications of a
government to the simplification of a single
actor .
2
The major factors of analysis of systems theory as des-
cribed here are international power and security, thus the
ability of a state to achieve its goals in a competitive inter-
national system and protect itself from conflicting goals of
other nations. The basic argument of this chapter is that
Japan must shape its foreign policy according to the limits
imposed by the international system. This is undoubtedly true
to some extent of every country. The argument, therefore, is
contingent upon the establishment of Japan's unique dependence
on the external setting. The idea that Japan has a unique
foreign policy setting will be developed throughout the study,
but it should be noted here that: (1) Japan has an unusual im-
balance in economic, military and political power; (2) Japan
2Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1971), p. 252.
3has a tremendous impact on the global economy; (3) Japan lacks
a well-defined regional alliance or natural group of support-
ers; and (4) because of its economic structure, Japan must
deal with a broad cross-section of nations throughout the
world. These factors suggest that Japan cannot avoid being
woven into and directly affected by the evolving pattern of
the international system, for it has no buffer to ease the
shock of external changes
.
West Germany, a country often compared with Japan since
World War II, has recovered under quite different circumstances
as a member of NATO and the Common Market, and has therefore
been able to tie her security to the defense of the Western
world and her economic development to a strong regional econo-
my. Having neither of these options, Japan has become the
stepchild of the world, whose geographical, cultural and his-
torical ties with Asia conflict with economic, security and
ideological ties with the West. Such isolation from strong
links to any one group of nations explains Japan's unique
vulnerability to shifts in the international system.
A recognizable pattern has emerged in Japanese foreign
policy statements, which almost without exception pay heed to
the extreme importance for Japan of the external constraints
4on policy. A recent Ministry of Foreign Affairs White Paper
is a typical example.
Needless to say, Japan's national interests are
largely dependent on the peace and prosperity
of the world. Japan has been able to acquire
its national power of today, despite its small
land, dense population and limited natural
resources, because there has been no large-
scale war in the world and because it has been
able to lie in peace and to share in prosperity
with other countries through a system of free
economic interchange. For Japan to achieve
the construction of a peaceful and affluent
society, which it hopes for, there must be,
first of all, a peaceful and prosperous inter-
national society.^
The tendency to mention external prerequisites for Japan's con-
tinued success is more than platitude for it indicates the
Japanese perception that their foreign policy is first and
foremost bounded by the nature of the international climate.
The Cold War International System
The outside world Japan faced in the 1950 's and early
1960 's was a clearly defined bipolar system of ideological,
economic and political division between the West, centered
around the power of the United States, and the group of nations
linked to the Soviet Union. Since the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
emerged from World War II as the only major powers, tensions
5japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers
of Japan 1971-1972 (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International
Affairs, 1973), p. 34.
5built in the regions bordering the two power blocs, notably
Europe and East Asia. Although there are conflicting theories
explaining the origins of the cold war, the fact remains that
national security became the most immediate foreign policy goal
of most states. Alliance with one of the two cold war camps
was almost a foregone conclusion since the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
were the only two guarantors of security, as well as the two
major sources of economic aid and political support. Neutral-
ity was a difficult path to follow in the 1950's, strengthening
the cohesion of each camp. The structure of relations was
driven by confrontation and global tension, but its major char-
acteristic was stability, since there were limited possibilities
for shifting alliances or multiple coalitions. In sum there
was little room for diplomatic maneuver outside the framework
of the cold war coalitions. Seyom Brown describes the cold
war international system in similar terms. "National security
was so dependent on the cohesion of one's coalition that the
coalition itself tended to be regarded as an end rather than
u4
a means. ^
Since cold war rivalry spread to all sections of the globe,
Asian regional foreign policies were subordinate to the larger
4Seyom Brown, New Forces In World Politics (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 9.
6stakes represented by the big-power struggle. The U.S. efforts
to contain China and limit Soviet influence in East Asia led
to an American presence in Asia which, for practical purposes,
eliminated the possibility of a grossly divergent Japanese
foreign policy, especially given the instability on the Korean
peninsula and the hostility of the Sino-Soviet coalition. Con-
sidering the seven year occupation of Japan, the continued oc-
cupation of the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands, and the wide-
spread resentment in East Asia of a half century of Japanese
imperialist policy, it is little wonder that Japan consistently
pursued a low posture foreign policy, especially during the two
decades of the "classical cold war."^
Most analysts of Japanese foreign policy during this
period dwell upon the close relationship with the United States.
Donald Hellmann used the following metaphor- "The alliance with
America has served as an international incubator. . . . "^
- implying that Japan was unable to pursue successfully its
foreign policy goals and therefore that an independent and thus
satisfactory foreign policy was out of reach. However, if a
^This term refers to the extreme bipolar system of the
1950's and implies that the cold war continues, but in a dif-
ferent form.
6Donald Hellmann, "The Confrontation with 'Realpolitik ' ,
"
in Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970 's , ed. by James
Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 137.
7successful foreign policy is measured by the ability to achieve
desired goals, by making choices among available alternatives,
then Japan s postwar foreign policy can only be judged a
smashing success. It is the compatibility of the cold war
stability and open economic system with Japan's goal of eco-
nomic recovery which should be stressed. Japan depended on
the United States for national security, avoided cold war ten-
sions by leaving to the U.S. considerations of ’high politics.' 7
and concentrated on building ties with the world economic sys-
tem by means of a further policy of the separation of politics
and economics. This strategy was able to make use of the pre-
vailing international system to Japanese advantage. Thus, the
relevant fact of the 1950's and early 1960's was the range of
choice open to Japan in building the foundation of its eco-
nomic miracle, rather than the seemingly excessive constraints
on policy in other areas.
7Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles
, p. 404. High politics
is defined as "vital interests of national diplomacy and
strategy." Part of Japan's foreign policy problem is that many
nations now consider economic issues to be within the scope of
high politics. This trend compromises Japan's broad range of
economic relations. Also see Hellmann, "The Confrontation
with 'Realpolitik' ," p. 136, in which the author characterizes
high politics as "power and prestige" with a decided "military
dimention .
"
8The Present International System
If the twenty-year period following the second world war
was a time of bipolarity, superpower dominance, and the su-
preme importance of security issues in a relatively stable
international system, the 1960's saw a breakup of the cold
war structure and the introduction of new forces in inter-
national relations which greatly altered Japan's range of
foreign policy choice.
The realization by the United States and the Soviet Union
that no victor was possible if brinksmanship and confrontation
led to war, was a major cause of a relaxation of tensions.
For the first time since 1945 the two nations acted jointly
on a recognized mutual interest - that of survival. It became
obvious that competition would have to shift to other planes.
As the superpowers grappled with the complexities of nuclear
weapons control, the salience of the previously dominant secu-
rity issue began to wane.
The Sino-Soviet split also had an important effect on the
dilution of the classical cold war international system. Not
only did Soviet-American tension slacken as a result of the-
oretically unuseable nuclear weapons, but one of the two
coalitions began to fracture. These forces undermined the
very rationale for coalition solidarity. The climate for a
9new flexibility in foreign policy choices was perceived by
middle and small states as they saw that the tremendous mili-
tary power held by the superpowers was in fact a handcuff to
flexible action, and that the international political scene
was becoming more complex and ripe for diplomatic innovation.
Cold war positions were often defined and expressed in
ideological terms. Although there were some exceptions,
ideology was the cement which held the two superpower coalitions
together. Building socialism in the East and strengthening the
free world in the West became phrases designed to subordinate
national policy to the broader goals of the East or West, goals
with more import than narrow national interest. As the pre-
dominance of security issues began to be challenged by non-
security issues supported by coalitions of lesser powers, so
too did ideological solidarity begin to moderate. As issues
such as economic development, the food crisis, and energy
needs - issues which tend to cut across ideological planes -
began to frequent diplomatic agendas, superpowers became less
and less able to define the structure of world politics. In
1968 Henry Kissinger wrote of the United States, and by im-
plication the Soviet Union, that: "The United States is no
longer in a position to operate programs globally; it has to
encourage them. It can no longer impose its preferred solu-
10
tion, it must seek to evoke it." As the constraints on foreign
policy were reduced, the agendas of international diplomacy
began to reflect the needs of many nations instead of the mili-
tary confrontation of only two.
In 1972 the changing nature of the cold war was indicated
by an American President in Moscow and Peking, both visits in
the same year, as well as the visit of the Soviet party chief
to Washington in 1973. Detente, or the easing of tensions
between nations, characterizes the present state of superpower
relations, although it is more of an international atmosphere
than a solution to root problems.
The new flexibility in international affairs was a signal
to design more independent policies reflecting more narrowly
defined national interests. Third world coalitions appeared
in defiance of both superpowers, and new regional groups began
forming to achieve stronger economic and political bargaining
power. Japan's politics, on the other hand, seemed to be fro-
zen. Few initiatives came from Tokyo in response to the newly
flexible international system. In fact it is this flexibility
which carried with it new problems - dangers as well as new
opportunities. But it was clearly the dangers inherent in the
%enry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, Three Essays
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 93.
11
new international power relationships which shaped Japan's re-
action. By the late 1960 s it was obvious that the superpowers
could no longer be responsible for a broad range of national
policies. The spreading of international power demanded that
Japan begin to formulate independent foreign policy positions
in many areas such as trade, foreign aid, and regional politics.
The opportunities for renewed nationalism created a dilem-
ma for Japan which remains at the center of her foreign policy
today. It is well described by Henry Kissinger.
We are in a period of relaxation of tensions.
But as the rigid decisions of the past two
decades diminish, new assertions of national
identity and national rivalry emerge.
^
Toward such an international environment Japan could only be
ambivalent. On the one hand, the growing desire to achieve
international prestige appropriate to its important place in
the global economy was a centrifugal force propelling Japan
into the international arena. However, exposure to new forms
of national rivalry presented clear dangers to the achieve-
ment of Japan's other goals of security and continued economic
growth. The relaxation of international tensions brought with
it a less stable system in which more rapid shifts in alliances
and coalitions could take place. Such shifts were not con-
gruent with Japan's desire for a firm pattern of international
^New York Times, April 24, 1973.
12
relations on which to base long-term economic relationships.
Therefore Japan began to espouse a philosophy of international-
ism as a means of coping with newly independent sources of
power. Internationalism would insulate Japan from increasingly
nationalistic, and regional, politics averse to global economic
intercourse, and was thus a natural response to the external
setting
.
A closer look at the present international system reveals
the following general patterns.
(1) Bipolarity continues to describe the military superi-
ority of the United States and the Soviet Union. In a serious
military confrontation, these two superpowers are the only
nations that matter. This fact continues to influence the over-
all pattern of international relations, though not as directly
as it did during the early cold war.
(2) The loosening of the bipolarity in recent years has
brought about more assertive, independent policymaking from
middle and lower powers, or multipolarity. The movement of
international politics is now determined by an increasing num-
ber of power centers combining in more complex and less pre-
dictable patterns. Multipolarity, or the distribution of power
to a greater number of actors, is assigned a political content
by Kissinger, who wrote of "a world which is bipolar militarily
13
and multipolar politically.
. .
."10 Equally valid is Stanley
Hoffmann's military conception of multipolarity whereby nuclear
proliferation spreads out military poker chips once held by
only two players.
H
(3) As corollary to multipolarity, superpowers can no
longer define international problems in their own terms. The
United States and the Soviet Union are unable to solve economic
problems without the participation of other nations in finding
a solution.
(4) The critical interaction of the international system
is the U.S.-U.S.S.R.-P.R.C. triangle, which includes a) U.s.-
U.S.S.R. bipolar underpinning in a period of detente, b) Sino-
Soviet hostilities which show no signs of easing, c) U.S.-
P.R.C. rapprochement which is fueled by b).
(5) Due to the new centers of independent power, there
were indications, especially during the Nixon presidency, of
an emerging balance of power system. In July 1971, Nixon spoke
of the international political interplay among five major
powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's
Republic of China, Western Europe and Japan. The Nixon-
Kis singer foreign policy was inclined to eschew permanent
l^Kissinger
,
American Foreign Policy
,
p. 85.
llHoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles
,
p. 43-46.
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alliances in favor of a shifting balance. One prerequisite for
a balance of power system, however, is a homogeneous group of
nations. Of the above mentioned, one is not a nuclear power
and one is not even a nation. Also, there still exist unre-
solved ideological differences which will continue to define
foreign policy goals and preclude the operation of a balance
of power system.
The tendencies toward the balance of power, however lim-
ited, have been an irritant to Japan. A nation with a philos-
ophy of internationalism and global interdependence would have
to reject the notion of a "mechanical balance. "12 The Japanese
position on this issue is revealed in a government policy state-
ment .
It is hoped that the U.S. side will also gauge
correctly Japan's capabilities and the wishes
of its people and, instead of being carried
away by the simple, so-called theory of the
balance of power, will act in such a way as to
make its relations with its allies truly mean-
1 O
ingful in the multi-polar age. J
The complexity of the world today makes it difficult to
arrive at conclusions as to the nature of the international
system and its effect on Japanese foreign policy. What is
12Masataka Kosaka, Options for Japan's Foreign Policy ,
Adelphi Paper No. 97 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies [hereafter IISS] 1973), p. 40.
12japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers ,
p . 36
.
15
clear is that the bipolar confrontation which gave definite
shape to world politics in the post-war era has dissipated.
New forces in world politics can be identified, but there is
no dominant structure. The world is now in a transitional
period in which an increasingly powerful third world, an in-
fluential group of oil producing nations, a newly assertive
group of middle powers, and new constraints on superpower domi-
nance, have combined to set in motion a process of adjustment,
but to what end it is difficult to foresee. The absence of a
dominant international structure is extremely important to
Japan. The uncertainty in the world makes it difficult for
Japan to carry out its foreign policy with assurance.
The fluid, undefined nature of international relations
has led all nations, not just Japan, to grope for some "agreed
concept of order. But whereas many nations are now fur-
thering their own interests by the hardening of national bound-
aries and the assertion of national power, Japan's interest
lies in the formation of a lasting global system of interdepen-
dent parts less prone to the pitfalls of uncertain rivalry.
Multipolarity is the international trend from which the
specific Japanese foreign policy dilemma arises. During the
classical cold war period Japan adjusted to the external set-
ting by signing the Security Treaty with the United States.
•^Kis singer. American Foreign Policy , p. 57.
16
Japan dealt politically with the outside world through that
relationship. Multipolarity means that Japan must now inter-
act politically with many centers of power. Since these power
centers often collide, or at least advocate contradicting
policies, Japan is forced to make decisions which, while
favorable to some nations, are unfavorable to others.
As the foreign policy of most nations is gradually shift-
toward the economic area, Japan's foreign policy is under-
going a change in the opposite direction. This process has
been described as the unavoidable return to the Realpolitik of
international politics. 15 It is true that the necessity of
making independent foreign policy decisions in a multipolar
period draws Japan into the flow of international politics.
The real issue is not whether Japan will assume a more integra-
tive role in world affairs politically as well as economically,
but what the nature of that role is to be.
The following excerpt from a Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs White Paper describes the importance of the external
setting in narrowing the available foreign policy options.
In other words, multipolarization enables Japan
to expand the range of its diplomatic activities
more than ever before and to have diverse options.
15Dona Id Hellmann
,
Japan and East Asia, The New Inter -
national Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. xi.
17
It is also clear that, on the other hand, Japan
is required to take even more prudent and respon-
sible action to meet international expectations
and trust, [emphasis added ] 16
The Nature of International Power
A critical aspect of the emerging international system
is a change in the nature of international power and the way
it is applied. The previous analysis suggests that Japan will
have to deal with the external environment on the basis of its
own independent resources and less as an ally of the United
States. Japan's role in world politics will depend largely
upon how it chooses to accomplish its goals, and these deci-
sions are in turn shaped by the changing nature of interna-
tional power.
In the cold war of the immediate post-war period, power
was still a function of military capability. Policy was often
a direct calculus of strategic position and relative military
strength, as well as related factors of technology and natural
resources. Now the superpowers are left with a devalued cur-
rency of power. Brute force is no longer the only or the most
prominent method of settling disputes or improving international
prestige. New forms of power have complemented, and in some
cases replaced, the old. The use of power in peacetime has
lb japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers ,
p . 34.
18
become much more important. 17 However, its new complexity ren-
ders it difficult to describe or measure, and more difficult to
use diplomatically. 18 The more abstract character of power in
a multipolar era led one analyst to lament that "because the
new factors of power are complex and varied, their playing has
3- flexibility that seems to defy analysis." 1 ^
We can begin to untangle the difficult notion of power by
noting that it is a relational concept, not something which can
have meaning independently of an external referent. Power can-
not be stored for use at any time. U.S. ammunition stockpiles,
once so able to influence the actions of others by use or threat
of use, now hold little of their original value. The weapons
can do the same physical damage, but because of a change in the
external context, they no longer achieve the same political
results
.
At a time when multipolarity thrives and interdependence
and cooperation are at least recognized as fruitful, if not
necessary, paths to the solution of international ills, Japan's
international position has been enhanced. This is often atrib-
uted to the 'economic miracle', but of greater significance is
the manner in which Japan's economy is linked to the outer
world. From this vantage point the broadranging interdependence
17Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles
,
p. 32.
18Kissinger, American Foreign Policy , p. 62.
1 9Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, p. 35.
19
of Japan's economy with the rest of the world and the need for
international cooperation are key factors.
The present international system indicates that: (1) power
will be most effectively expressed in peacetime, (2) economic
bargaining chips are becoming more important relative to mili-
tary capability, and (3) heightened influence will fall to
countries with diverse contacts crossing many state and region-
al lines. Japan's position coincides favorably with these
general statements of international power; it is mainly these
external changes which account for the status of present-day
Japan. Had the conditions of the early cold war continued,
Japan would not have achieved its present importance in inter-
national affairs, in spite of its economic strength. It is not
economic strength alone but its combination with a particular
international system which gives it value. Seyom Brown puts it
this way.
In the new system the most influential countries
are likely to be those that are major construc-
tive participants in the widest variety of
coalitions and joint or multilateral ventures,
since they would have the largest supply of use-
able political currency- in effect, promissory
notes for support on one issue in return for
support on another. ^0
Since traditional forms of power are no longer feasible, it is
these new, more abstract types which will define international
^bBrown. New Forces , p. 112-113.
20
power, and which are important to keep in mind when thinking
about Japan's increasing international activity.
Japan's important place in international affairs is often
mistakenly equated with international power, resulting in mis-
guided calculations of the possible Japanese role in world
politics. That Japan is a "major constructive participant"
in a great variety of bilateral and multilateral activities
cannot be denied. But this has brought with it greater vulner-
ability and added burdens to Japan which do not necessarily
increase its ability to achieve desired goals. It does, how-
ever, compel Japan to accept new international responsibilities.
The concept of 'importance' is more applicable to Japan's
position, although importance is not synonymous with power.
Japan's post-war, low-key foreign policy was successfully de-
signed to avoid the necessity of making difficult political
choices detrimental to the growth of the economy. The foreign
policy dilemma today stems from the more frequent requirement
of making just such decisions, unavoidable due to Japan's
importance in the world, but dangerous because of a dearth of
political currency to support such actions.
The fact that the enhanced importance of Japan to inter-
national affairs weakened its foreign policy, suggests that
Brown's discussion of the new forms of international power must
21
be altered in Japan s case. Postwar foreign policy has con-
centrated on building the economy. Since efforts were made
to separate political matters from the negotiations Japan was
involved in, Japan did not develop the political currency to
which Brown alludes. Negotiations have not treated economic
packages as components of a larger political framework.
Lacking political bargaining chips, Japan's role as a major
constructive participant in a wide variety of international
relationships has created a serious vulnerability to external
political pressures.
In order to achieve its goals, Japan has also expected
much of the international environment - relative international
stability, free access to the purchase of natural resources,
an open economic system, and the latitude to continue economic
relations, even with nations opposed to each other. Japan
must do all in its power to insure the continuation of these
conditions. However, Japan has deemphasized the use of inde-
pendent political leverage, in order to protect the wide range
of economic relations it now enjoys. Raymond Aron noted that
"Switzerland and Sweden, which have virtually no desire or
possibility of influencing the thought or action of other
22
nations, are less vulnerable to foreign pressures . "21 Just the
opposite applies to Japan.
This consideration of international power suggests that
Japan will not be able to pursue successfully a role in world
politics supported by the conventional understanding of power
politics. Japan is uniquely situated to develop a new type of
international power based not on nuclear weapons or traditional
alliances, but on international cooperation, global economic
interdependence and the intangible moral force of a potential
nuclear power renouncing that path to global influence. Also
suggested here is that it may be premature to speak of Japan
as a 'superpower' or even as a 'major power'. Japan's position
is unique - a nation whose advanced economy affects global
trends, but a nation unable as yet to effectively use this
economic power to achieve other political goals.
2lRaymond Aron, Peace and War, A Theory of International
Relations
,
an abridged version trans . by Richard Howard and
Annette Baker Fox (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 55.
23
CHAPTER II
JAPAN AND THE WEST
The United States
The sensitivity of Japan’s foreign policy to external
stimuli is nowhere more evident than in the relationship with
the United States. The United States was the dominant figure
in Japan's international environment by offering economic
concessions, political support for such goals as reentry into
the United Nations, and a security guarantee. The political
and military support continue, although a new interpretation
must now be attached to each, due to changes in international
politics. The post-war economic relationship which lasted
two decades was initiated only after the United States recog-
nized that growing cold war tensions placed new value on an
economically strong, democratic ally in East Asia. In fact,
the nature of the whole relationship was shaped more by the
U.S. confrontation with the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. than by
an intrinsic friendship between Japan and the United States.
Even President Kennedy's notion of 'partnership' with Japan,
and the accompanying economic support for Prine Minister
Ikeda's domestic economic growth plans, was motivated by the
need to strengthen the American footing in Asia because of
24
renewed cold war tensions.^-
Furthermore, continued economic support was destined to
end once the faltering U.S. economy was directly affected by
Japan s economic success. Despite the new rivalry, largely
economic in nature, the United States remains a central focus
of Japanese foreign policy. This importance is likely to re-
main, even if Japanese-American ties are significantly loosened,
because American decisions in Asia, and on global economic mat-
ters, will always have a direct effect on Japan. Nearly 307o
of Japan’s total imports and exports are carried out with the
United States, which is a block of trade not easily replaced
or duplicated elsewhere.
When Prime Minister Miki addressed the Diet after assuming
office, he noted his understanding of the relationship with the
United States.
There is no change in our basic policy though
the cabinet has changed. There is no change
in the fact that the maintenance and strength-
ening of Japan-U.S. friendly relations repre-
sent the pivotal part of Japan's diplomacy.
2
This statement could have been made by any of the post-war prime
ministers, although this does not mean that important changes in
Japanese-American relations have not occurred which affect the
.C
.
Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: Univer-
sity of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 55.
2Japan Report
,
"Gist of Prime Minister Miki's Speech,"
January 16, 1975, p. 3.
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range of choice open to Japanese foreign policy. On the con-
trary, it is proof of the importance of the U.S. to Japan,
that in spite of the shockwaves which have been felt on either
side of the Pacific, Japan would still recognize what it per-
ceives to be an overriding national interest in a relationship
with the United States.
Emerging competition
. A symbolic milestone was passed in
1965 when, for the first time, the customary U.S. advantage in
the bilateral balance of trade shifted to favor Japan. Japan
was becoming important to the United States, not merely as a
supply depot for Asian military operations, but by having a
direct impact upon the health of the American economy. Japan
lacked the diplomatic and political strength to use this new
importance to the United States to best advantage. Conse-
quently, instead of buttressing its ability to achieve foreign
policy goals, the outcome of Japan's overwhelming economic
growth was to trigger in the United States a reevaluation of
certain aspects of the alliance.
In a foreign policy report issued to Congress in February,
1972, President Nixon stressed that the Japanese dependence
upon the United States must change.
This relationship stands out as a major success
of American postwar diplomacy. Its purpose was
to provide the sustenance and security required
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for economic and psychological recovery from
the trauma of World War II. That recovery is
complete.
. . . Our relationship now requires
greater reciprocity. 3
Once the international system became more flexible, and Japan's
economy provided competition for U.S. markets, there was no
alternative to a fundamental rethinking of the Japanese-
American relationship in both Washington and Tokyo.
Much of the problem centered around an imbalance in the
alliance, which was bound to cause friction. During the clas-
sical cold war period such an imbalance was accepted. After
Japan emerged as an important economic power, this imbalance
could no longer play a constructive role.
Symbolic of the emerging competition, the textile crisis
was the first important issue on which negotiations broke down
in stalemate. In 1970 textiles were 12.570 of total Japanese
exports and represented 10.1% of the exports to the United
States The U.S. textile industry, Southern-based and weak-
ened due to growing competition from Hong Kong, South Korea,
Taiwan, as well as Japan, was able to extract from Nixon a
3U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, The Emerging Struc -
ture of Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon,
President of the United States, February 9, 1972 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 53.
^Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
OECD Economic Surveys : Japan (Paris: Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 1974), p. 80.
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campaign promise of protection for the industry in exchange
for political support - a key element of the Southern Strategy
of Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign. 5 Japanese textiles
represented only 1.3% of the total U.S. domestic textile
sales. 6 The textile case reveals an interesting meshing of
foreign and domestic policies, but the point here is that, as
one observer noted, "it was the first time Japan had deci-
sively said "NO" to the United States."
7
Eventually, pressure was applied to Japan which it could
not withstand. A special ambassador, David Kennedy, was sent
by the United States to conclude textile agreements with the
textile nations of Asia. A further weapon was the threat to
block ratification of the Okinawa reversion treaty. Finally,
an agreement was initialed on October 15, 1971, which included
most of the American demands for mandatory export controls.®
During the final round of textile negotiations. President
Nixon discussed the American position regarding its traditional
allies
.
^John K. Emmerson
,
Arms, Yen & Power, The Japanese Dilem-
ma (New York: Dune lien Publishing Company, 1971), p. 375.
6Robert Scalapino, American- Japanese Relations In a
Changing Era
,
The Washington Papers: 2 (New York: The Library
Press, 1972), p. 28.
'Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power
, p. 374.
8 Lee W. Farnsworth, "Japan: The Year of the Shock", Asian
Survey
,
XII, No. 1 (1972), 50-51.
28
Both Western Europe and Japan are very potent
competitors of the U.S.; friends, yes; allies,
yes; but competing and competing very hard
with us throughout the world for economic
leadership .
9
This was a clear signal to Japan that the old relationship of
favored client was over. Japan was forced to begin considering
ways to muster enough political strength and diplomatic support
to protect economic interests, once insured by the very separa-
tion of such considerations from economic negotiations.
Another example, the 'dollar shock' of August 1971, was
a manifestation of the growth of independent sources of eco-
nomic power in the world. The United States felt it had to
take unilateral action to protect its predominant position in
the world economy and to cure an adverse balance of payments
and rising inflation. The 10% surcharge placed on all imports
was a serious blow to Canada and Europe, but was aimed pri-
marily at the $4.1 billion trade deficit with Japan. Although
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) members
promptly declared the surcharge illegal, -*-9 the United States
was still able to use its economic policy as a political tool.
The policy was also designed to force the revaluation of the
9u . S . Department of State, Bulletin , LXV , No. 1674
(July 26, 1971), 94.
lORoji Taira, "Power and Trade in U . S . -Japanese Rela-
tions," Asian Survey , XII, No. 10 (1972), 982.
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Japanese yen, an action resisted by Japan. By December 1971,
the Smithsonian Agreement was signed by nine nations, revalu-
ating the yen upward 16 . 88% . -*-*-
The first of the Nixon shocks was the most psychologically
distressing to the Japanese, for it undermined the credibility
of the U.S
. alliance. The announcement in July 1971 of the
Nixon trip to Peking, made without prior consultation with
Japanese officials, was a serious blow to Japan's foreign
policy. Japan had hoped to play a role as mediator, by easing
tensions in Indochina through proposals for regional economic
aid and thereby contributing to improved Sino-American rela-
tions. It was not the American rapprochement with China but
the failure of the U.S. to consider Japan in its plans, which
was the reason for the 'shock' effect of the Nixon announce-
ment. Although Japan had cultivated economic relations with
China over the years, the Nixon shock immediately isolated
Japan from her most important Asian neighbor.
The short-term impact of the U.S. China policy was bene-
ficial to Japan. Excessive dependence on the United States
was brought to an end. The imbalance in the relationship was
checked, although not eradicated. Japan was forced to assume
more independent control of her diplomatic activity. The
^-J-Scalapino
,
American- Japanese Relations
,
p. 34.
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Sino-Japanese normalization of relations was accomplished only
six months after the Nixon trip by a new Prime Minister who
pledged a more positivist foreign policy. From this perspec-
tive, a new flexibility in Japanese foreign policy options
was the immediate outcome of the U.S. policy toward China.
run, however, the U.S. attempts to nurture a
balance of power at the expense of traditional allies was not
easy for the Japanese to understand. The American preoccupa-
tion with the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C., intending to bring about a
period of flexible negotiation, confirmed for Japan that the
special relationship with the United States was ended. Indi-
cations are that the Nixon shock was at least partially de-
signed to push Japan out of the American nest.
The White House apparently believed that Japan’s psycho-
logical dependence on the U.S. was not consistent with broader
U.S. foreign policy goals and that policies calculated to
force Japan to a more independent foreign policy would, in the
long run, add to the stability of Japanese-American relations.
This view is supported by the February 1972 Nixon foreign
policy report to Congress.
The shocks of 1971, therefore, only acceler-
ated an evolution in U . S . -Japanese relations that
was in any event, overdue, unavoidable, and in
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the long run, desirable. 12
We recognize that some of our actions during
the past year placed the Japanese Government
in a difficult position. We recognize that
our actions have accelerated the Japanese
trend toward more autonomous policies. We
regret the former, but could not do otherwise.
We welcome the latter as both inevitable and
desirable - inevitable because it reflects the
reality of Japanese strength in the 1970's -
desirable because it is a necessary step in
the transformation of our relationship to the
more mature and reciprocal partnership re-
quired in the 1970's. 12
The likelihood of, in Nixon's words, "the divergence of some
of our interests" 1^ forced Japan to expand the intensity and
diversity of its diplomatic activity. The change in the nature
of the U.S
.
alliance enhanced the Japanese reliance on inter-
national cooperation and globalism.
The Japan-U.S. partnership in a global context . Japanese-
American relations during the last three decades can be di-
vided into three periods: (1) Japanese dependence on U.S. sup-
port in all areas - economic, political, military - during the
classical cold war, (2) emerging economic rivalry, beginning in
the middle 1960 's and continuing through the early 1970's, and
(3) the present period of adjustment in relations to reflect re-
cent political and economic changes in the international system.
l^U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970' s. The Emerging Struc -
ture of Peace
,
p. 52.
3-3 Ibid
.
,
p. 58.
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The upheavals of the middle period compelled Japan to
consider the relationship with the United States as only one
part of a complex pattern of external relations. Japanese
foreign policy shifted from a concentration on the United
States to an increased awareness of the total pattern.
As early as 1970, the United States began to speak in
terms of a 'partnership' 15 with Japan, which implied new
responsibilities for Japan in Asia. This notion of partner-
ship parallels the reduced U.S. presence in the world and the
essence of the Nixon Doctrine, which is a 'devolution of
American power." 16 The limitations of American power led
former Prime Minister Tanaka to state bluntly that "the United
States is not the almighty answer to all problems." 1 ^
Japan recognizes that it must consider the U.S. relation-
ship in a broader context, one more consistent with the trend
toward multilateral solutions to international problems. The
Washington Summit Conference of August 1973 solidified the new
15 U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for
Peace
,
A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President
of the United States, February 18, 1970 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 58.
16Robert E. Osgood, The Weary and the Wary: U.S. and
Japanese Security Policies in Transition Studies in Internation-
al Affairs Number 16 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1972), pp. 83-90.
^Washington Post
,
August 1, 1973.
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di^-^ctiion in the U.S.-Japan alliance, as revealed in the Nixon-
Tanaka joint communique.
They noted especially that the relationship
between their two countries has an increasing-
ly important global aspect and makes a signifi-
cant contribution to the movement toward peace-
ful relations throughout the world. 18
The new relationship does not mean that the United States
has stopped offering support to Japan on selected issues. On
the contrary, President Nixon gave explicit backing to one of
Japan's most desired foreign policy goals, a permanent seat in
the U N Security Council.
The President expressed the belief that for the
Security Council to fulfill its primary respon-
sibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security under the United Nations
Charter, a way should be found to assure perma-
nent representation in that council for Japan,
whose resources and influence are of major im-
portance in world affairs. 19
Japan will continue to seek diplomatic support from the United
States, although it will not be forthcoming on many issues,
such as the global energy crisis, where interests do not coin-
cide .
The altered American role in the multipolar era has
directly affected the range of Japanese foreign policy options.
Goals which were once politically impossible such as diplomatic
lbjapan Report
,
"Text of Tanaka-Nixon Communique," August
16, 1973, p. 2.
19 Ibid.
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relations with China became relatively easy to achieve. It
would have been unthinkable twenty years ago for a top-level
U.S. foreign policy report to contain the following statement.
Japan has interests of her own of which she
herself will be the untimate judge. Our
foreign policies will not be identical or
invariably in step. 20
This assertion was part of the new relationship in 1973, a
relationship which suited the Japanese itch to gain a measure
of international independence and prestige. On the other
hand, Japan can take little comfort from the knowledge that
U.S. policy toward Japan is largely dictated by the dynamics
of the U . S . -U . S . S . R . - P . R . C . triangle. Also, the benefits of
greater independence can only be of practical value if Japan
overcomes the political isolation resulting from more flexible
relations with the United States.
Trilateralism
The fact that Japan's political and economic systems
largely follow Western patterns indicates a special relation-
ship which exists between Japan and the Western, industrialized
nations of North America and Western Europe. In November 1973
the Trilateral Commission met in New York City for the first
2^U.S. Foreign "Policy for the 1970's, Shaping a Durable
Peace
,
A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of
the United States, May 3, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1973), p. 102.
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time, with Prime Minister Tanaka as the keynote speaker. Al-
though this commission is a non-governmental organization, its
existence is symbolic of efforts to define the political re-
lationship among the three centers of 'free-world' economic
power. The Commission assumes that it is in the interest of
the three comers of the triangle to develop closer ties and
more coordinated policies, since their generally similar sys-
tems should lead to a coincidence of foreign policy goals. A
further rationale for trilateralism is that Japan's importance
to the world can best be understood and channeled in a joint,
cooperative affiliation. Trilateralism is relevant to Japan
because a broader Western alliance could fulfill the Nixon-
Tanaka goal of a U.S.-Japan relationship in a global context.
The idea of bringing Japan into a formal partnership with
the West was broached by Henry Kissinger during a speech in
April concerning revision of the Atlantic Charter. Although
this speech was reported to have included Japan in the plans
for a new Western alliance, in fact Japan was mentioned only
briefly. "Japan has emerged as a major power center. In many
2i
fields Atlantic solutions, to be viable, must include Japan."
Nonetheless, the Kissinger speech made it very clear that the
U.s. -Western European alliance would continue to exist on a
ZiThe New York Times, April 24, 1973.
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much higher plane than any broadened relationship with Japan.
Prime Minister Tanaka expressed interest in a formal
Japanese link with the West, and in July 1973, Tanaka stated
that one of the goals of his forthcoming trip to Washington
and Western Europe was to advance a "triangular relation-
ship 22 between Japan, the United States and Western Europe.
Tanaka also promised that Japan was ready "to contribute the
full measure of its capacity to this common cause. "22 although
external factors were to thwart Japan's efforts to consolidate
relations with the Western powers.
The summit conference in Washington did not advance the
cause of trilateralism as Tanaka had hoped. The communique
resulting from the talks with President Nixon mentioned only
"the desirability of a declaration of principles to guide
future cooperation among the industrialized democracies . "24
This vague reference to a larger Japanese role with the West
indicated a change in U.S. policy reflecting the difficulties
of creating such an alliance in times of economic competitive-
ness and heightened nationalism.
Many of these difficulties involve Europe. To begin with,
European-American relations were undergoing strains, ironically
2^xhe New York~~Times , July 24, 1973.
22fhe New York Times , August 2, 1973.
24japan Report
,
"Text of Tanaka-Nixon Communique," p. 2.
37
during the period designated by President Nixon as the 'Year
of Europe'. The oil crisis in the fall of 1973 pointed to
conflicting national interests. The United States, less
affected by new OPEC policy, could afford to meet the crisis
from strength, hoping to force the oil producing nations to
moderate their demands. Western Europe, and of course Japan,
was vulnerable, and therefore cautious of the U.S. approach
which, it considered provocative. The different approaches to
handling the oil crisis and the differing reactions to Arab
demands brought about a cooling in relations between the U.S.
and Europe. Japan did not want to become involved in the
bickering
.
Western European relations with Japan also showed signs
of weakening. Japan had never been close to Europe. Geo-
graphical, cultural, and historical differences have kept Japan
and Europe apart. Japan's growing economic impact served to
make Europe wary of any close relationship with Japan. Efforts
to strengthen the Common Market preoccupy Western Europe.
This, Prime Minister Tanaka found out during his visit to
France, Britain, and West Germany in October 1973. Although
received as an important foreign dignitary, Tanaka was unable
to extract from the Europeans any substantive commitments.
Japan's newfound importance to the world outdistanced Japan s
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ability to use it for diplomatic success. Not only was Europe
skeptical of Tanaka's motive in desiring an expanded Atlantic
Charter, some Europeans also viewed Japan as an advocate of
American interests. 26
In April 1974, a full year after Kissinger's first speech
on the subject, plans for closer ties to Europe were shelved
indefinitely by the Japanese. 26 Japan itself had had no suc-
cess in developing closer relations with the West. Once
signals were sent to Japan that U.S. support for the tri-
lateral idea was withdrawn, Japan could do nothing but give
up the idea as well. 22
Not only do external factors determine the feasibility
of a Japanese role with the West. The requirements of Japanese
diplomacy also place constraints on the development of tri-
lateralism. Since the U.S. and Europe represent nearly 40%
of Japan's export markets, 26 Japan is understandably concerned
about becoming involved in disputes which might arise within
the Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, a trilateral alliance of
democratic, industrialized, Western nations would run the risk
25koj i Nakamura, "Red-Carpet Rebuff," Far Eastern Eco -
nomic Review
,
LXXXII, No. 41 (1973), p. 13.
26New~York Times
,
April 21, 1974.
27 Ibid .
28japan External Trade Organization, White Paper on
International Trade, Japan 1974 (n.p. Japan External Trade
Organization, 1974), p. 9.
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of antagonizing the communist nations. Japan would not be
interested in tightening political and economic ties with the
West if ideological implications were attached.
A strong Western partnership would be counterproductive
to Japan if it were in any way exclusive, or used as leverage
against the developing nations. Statements on trilateralism
indicate that Japan hopes to develop economic relations with
Europe, prevent economic protectionism, and create more effec-
tive channels for prior consultation on major policy changes
among the industrialized nations of the West. However,
Japan's diplomatic requirements are too complex to be tied
solely to the West. For trilateralism to work it must be
loosely defined.
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CHAPTER III
JAPAN AND EAST ASIA: THE MAJOR POWERS
Regionalism
The concept of the regional subsystem is consistent with
middle-range systems theory adopted in this paper. The ratio-
nale for its use follows from characteristics of the present
international system, namely, multipolarity, the inability of
the devalued bipolar military power to compel compliance around
the world, and the increasingly regional basis of continued
bipolar competition. During the 1950's one could detect in
East Asia only the conflict between the East (the P.R.C., with
Soviet support) and the West (the United States). East Asia
itself was enveloped by this confrontation; no indigenous sup-
port for a purely regional focus survived in the context of
the bipolar international system. Regional goals were sub-
ordinated to the global struggle between the superpowers.
With the gradual disintegration of the cold war inter-
national system, however, alternatives to alliances with a
superpower became not only feasible, but necessary. As inter
action with major powers decreases, interaction with regional
neighbors increases. Both heightened rivalries as well as
local friendships have emerged, but the point here is that
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local issues take on added significance. Regionalism refers
to organizational efforts to improve security, strengthen
economic development, and establish diplomatic support, as
well as less formal interaction, as long as it is expressed
within a recognizable unit of the global international system.
For our purposes regionalism is defined as a group of nations,
within the same general geographical area, interacting on a
combination of economic, political, military, and cultural
planes, the impact of which is limited mainly to the region
in question. This does not preclude nations in a region
having important extra-regional relations - the definition
only stresses the existence of strictly regional concerns which
can be dealt with by regionally defined methods.
Decentralization of the international system is now an
important element of world politics, whether expressed through
the as yet limited success of regional organization, or by the
increased incidence of regional conflicts. The regional set-
ting, then, is an important aspect of the context of Japanese
foreign policy, since Japan interacts with other East Asian
nations and must react to area developments. There is now a
regional pattern of interaction in East Asia which supplements
the continuing military bipolarity. For Japan, not only are
there global constraints on foreign policy but regional ones
as well.
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The task of determining the members of an East Asian sys-
tem is arbitrary because different lists could be made according
to different criteria of selection. We begin with Japan's two
major communist neighbors, the People's Republic of China and
the Soviet Union, and the two Koreas in between. The Soviet
Union is historically a European power, but the implications
of Siberian development, the large Pacific naval force, and the
Soviet interests in East Asian collective security warrant the
inclusion of the Soviet Union. In South East Asia the five
member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) 1 and Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma are included.
Australia and New Zealand have reoriented their foreign policy
toward East Asia in recent years, mostly because of the British
decisions to join the Common Market and phase out military
commitments in the South East Asian area. Finally, the United
States is included, as a Pacific basin state with permanent
o
influence and interests in the area.
^Indonesia
,
the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Singapore
.
^The purpose here is to offer a general framework, as a
basis for discussing the regional context of Japan's foreign
policy. The concept of 'region', therefore, is loosely defined.
A more systematic approach is advanced by Louis J. Can tori and
Steven L. Spiegel, "The International Relations of Regions," in
Regional Politics and World Order , ed. by Richard Falk and Saul
Mendlovitz (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman Company, 1973), pp.
335-353. In each region, the authors identify a cote sector,
a peripheral sector, and an intrusive system.
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As the will to use nuclear weapons waned, a nation’s geo-
graphical position took, on added significance. Xn fact, the
growth of regionalism alone is an indication that geopolitics
may be of renewed importance to foreign policy options. Japan
is located at the point where the world's three most powerful
nations meet. This cannot but continue to affect Japan's
foreign policy considerations. Furthermore, Japan is uniquely
insular, though situated in the midst of powerful nations.
The lack of land borders leaves open a certain degree of
flexibility, although Japan will always represent a crucial
strategic interest to China, the Soviet Union, Korea and the
United States. Japan is a unique link between East and West
in North East Asia. Culturally and historically Asian, but
industrially Western, Japan has also had to tread carefully in
South East Asia. Japan represents a unique hybrid of cultures,
ideologies, and development patterns which are best seen through
Japan's East Asian setting.
A country's relationship to a region is determined initi-
ally by geography, but also by trade relations, strategic
factors, and political decisions as to how closely a nation
chooses to integrate policy with the region. Is Japan limited
to a regional role in international affairs, or are there
actually constraints upon Japan's integration with East Asia?
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How will the position in East Asia affect Japan's options in
selecting a broader international role? These questions sug-
gest a further question often posed in the form of an alter-
native between partnership with the West or leadership in East
3Asia. It is argued in this paper that serious constraints
block the exclusive pursuit of either alternative.
The United States in Asia
The East Asian component of U.S.-Japan relations effects
Japan's policy toward the regional environment. The American
presence in, and policy toward, East Asia has undergone drastic
changes in the last five years, which will influence Japanese
policy options in the years ahead.
The Nixon Doctrine was an indication that the United States
planned a reduced presence in East Asia. As a loosely defined
set of principles and proposals, the Doctrine did more to re-
flect the events of the immediate past than to shape the events
of the immediate future. Domestic problems combined with a
disaster in Indochina to necessitate a rethinking of American
3japanese partnership with the West is the thesis of
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom, Crisis and Change in
Japan (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). An alternative approach
is taken by Donald Hellmann who argues that Japan's position
in international affairs is linked to East Asia. See his Japan
and East Asia.
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foreign policy. President Nixon perceived that the Doctrine
"is given full meaning through a process that involves other
countries. indicating that American power was no longer able
to achieve its goals unaided. By implication, the Nixon Doc-
trine did not elaborate new patterns of international inter-
action; rather it refused to accept responsibility alone for
the patterns which would develop.
The Nixon Doctrine is more relevant to Japan than to any
other nation in East Asia, because it places new responsibili-
ties on American allies.
Our Asian friends, especially Japan, are in a
position to shoulder larger responsibilities
for the peaceful progress of the area.
Japan's partnership with us will be a key to
the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.-*
The premise of the new American Asian policy is that a lower
level of activity, focused on more limited but essential
interests, will be a more constructive approach to accomplish-
ing foreign policy goals. This policy offers Japan more flex-
ibility in managing its regional affairs.
4u t s. Foreign Policy for the 1970' s. Building for Peace ,
A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the
United States, February 25, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 20.
5u.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for
Peace
,
p. 54 and 58.
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Xn order to capitalize on this flexibility, Japan will
still have to pay close attention to America's changing posi-
tion in East Asia. There are clues to what this position will
be in the aftermath of the conflict in Indochina. The devas-
tating failure of United States policy in Vietnam and Cambodia
and the decision to withdraw all military forces indicate
that the U.S. can no longer play the role of an 'Asian Power.'
Thailand, once a militant American ally during the height of
the Vietnam war, has requested the withdrawal of all 25,000
United States troops by April, 1976. 6 Similarly, the Philip-
pines has asked to renegotiate a 1947 agreement establishing
American rights to the use of air and naval bases on Philippine
soil. ^ Both the Philippines and Thailand know that the United
States no longer has the will or the power to play an effec-
tive role on the Asian mainland, and have sought to redirect
their international relations away from the U.S., toward a
more solidified Asia. President Marcos is convinced that the
only purpose of the United States in East Asia is "to maintain
an effective presence over the air and sea lanes of the western
Pacific. Implied is the opinion that otherwise, the U.S.
would continue to play a disruptive role.
bThe New York~Times
,
April 10, 1975.
7 The New York Times , July 12, 1975.
8 The New York Times, July 8, 1975.
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There is every indication, however, that the U.S. intends
to maintain a strong posture in the Pacific, and that it is as
a 'Pacific Power' that the United States can most effectively
guard its most basic interests. According to the 1970 Presi-
dential foreign policy report:
First, we remain involved in Asia. We are
a Pacific power. We have learned that peace
for us is much less likely if there is no
peace m Asia.^
This report also noted a "growing sense of Asian identity," and
the development of "a new and healthy pattern of international
relationships in the region. "10 Since the United States will
be a less dominant element of the 'new pattern', other forces
will have a more direct effect upon the character of a post-
Vietnam Asia.
The Soviet Union
Japanese-Soviet relations involve the following issues:
(1) the Northern Territories dispute, (2) Japanese participa-
tion in Siberian development, (3) peace treaty negotiations,
and (4) Soviet proposals for an East Asian system of collective
security
.
9U<S
.
Foreign Policy for the 1970 's, A New Strategy for
Peace, p. 54.
10 ibid.
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The Northern Territories dispute can be traced back to
the closing days of World War II when the Soviet Union entered
the Pacific war breaking the Soviet- Japanese Neutrality Pact.^
A secret agreement was concluded at the Yalta conference of
February, 1945, that in return for Soviet entry into the war,
the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
After occupation of the islands, the Soviet Union began to
claim them as permanent national territory. The present con-
troversy, however, concerns only the southernmost of the
Kurile Islands, closest to Japan's northern island of Hok-
13kaido. Because of the Japanese feelings of betrayal, and
other cultural and ideological differences, the Soviet Union
is one of the nations least trusted by the Japanese. 1^ Such
feelings have had a negative effect upon diplomatic relations
and have undoubtedly heightened the intensity of Japanese
opinion regarding the Northern Territories.
* - - — -1LShigeo Sugiyama, "Diplomatic Relations between Japan
and the Soviet Union with Particular Emphasis on Territorial
Questions," in Japan in World Politics
,
ed. by Young C. Kim
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Asian Studies, 1972), p. 24.
According to the Pact, the Soviet Union was bound not to go
to war against Japan until at least April 24, 1946.
12 ibid
.
l^Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island, Shikotan Island, and
the Habomai Islands.
14-According to a public opinion poll conducted in January,
1975, by Ross Snyder & Son, Inc. (Delray Beach, Florida), The
Soviet Union was chosen as a least liked nation more often than
any other except South Korea.
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Two other wartime Allied conferences provide somewhat
contradictory documentation concerning ownership of the is-
lands. -*-5 The record becomes even more confusing if century-
old treaties are considered part of the evidence. At the 1951
San Francisco Peace Treaty conference, Prime Minister Yoshida
noted a claim only of Shikotan Island and the Habomai group. ^
Likewise, Article 9A of the 1956 Japan- Soviet Declaration
ending the state of war stated in part:
. . . the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and
taking into consideration the interests of
the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan
the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan,
the actual transfer to these islands to Japan
to take place after the conclusion of a Peace
Treaty. . . 17
Thus both sides agreed publicly during the 1950's that the
Shikotan and Habomai islands would eventually be transferred
to Japan. Premier Khruschev notified Tokyo in 1960 that return
of these same islands was contingent upon the withdrawal of
American troops from Japan. Since that time, Japanese and
Soviet positions have diverged even more.
l-^The Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943 followed by
the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945 were ambiguous as
to the status of the islands in question. See Shigeo Sugiyama
,
"Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union,"
pp. 22-23.
16 ibid
. ,
p . 26
.
17 ibid
.
,
p . 30.
l^Elizabeth Pond, "Japan and Russia: The View from Tokyo,"
Foreign Affairs, LII, No. 1 (1973), 146.
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The Northern Territories problem has been overtaken by
time and events; its solution has been frustrated by being
linked with other, seemingly unrelated issues. Until 1972 the
Soviet Union used the continued United States control of
Okinawa as leverage in the dispute. More recently, return of
the Northern Territories has been used as the carrot to entice
Japan to invest heavily, and on easy terms, in Siberia. The
U.S.S.R. can no longer separate the disagreement with Japan
from other territorial disputes, notably with the P.R.C., but
also involving Eastern Europe. If the Soviet Union acceded
to Japanese demands to alter the territorial status quo, other
claims against the Soviet Union would be strengthened. There-
fore, the position has been hardened, and officials in Moscow
are now unwilling to publicly discuss the issue, which Pravda
19
described as the "non-existent 'northern territories problem'".
The emotional nature of the Northern Territories issue is
intensified by Soviet harassment of Japanese fisherman in the
traditional fishing grounds surrounding the contested islands.
The Soviet navy has patrolled the area and from 1946-1970 the
I yDavid I. Hitchcock, Jr., "Joint Development of Siberia:
Decision-Making in Japanese-Soviet Relations," Asian Survey ,
XI, No. 3 (1971), 291.
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Japan Maritime Safety Agency reports 1336 vessels captured and
11,316 persons arrested. 2(1
The dispute involving the northern islands is the key
obstacle to better Soviet- Japanese relations. Furthermore
there appears to be no obvious solution. Since 1967, the
Japanese have had ad hoc committees in both Houses of the
Diet dealing with the Northern Territories. 21 All political
parties agree at least that the two southern islands should
be returned. The public statements of Prime Minister Miki
and Foreign Minister Miyazawa have been unequivocal in in-
sisting that the future of Soviet- Japanese relations rests on
the reversion of the northern islands. Since 1969 it has
been the policy of the Japanese government to designate
Shikotan, Etorofu, Kunashiri, and the Habomai Islands as
23Japanese territory on all maps. It is possible that the
solution to this problem lies in the broader context of Asian
^Shigeo Sugiyama, "Diplomatic Relations between Japan
and the Soviet Union," p. 33. Elizabeth Pond reports that in
1973 500 vessels and 70 persons were still held by the Soviet
Union. "Japan and Russia," pp. 150-151.
21Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers
of Japan 1971-1972
, pp. 399-405.
^For example, Japan Report
,
"Policy Speech by Prime
Minister Takeo Miki," March 1, 1975 (special supplement), p.
3., and Ibid., "Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa," p. 6.
23nitchcock, "Joint Development of Siberia," p. 288.
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security and gradually developing economic relationships, but
for the time being the Northern Territories disagreement will
forestall close Soviet- Japanese diplomatic relations.
Since 1955, when negotiations resumed diplomatic rela-
tions but failed to conclude a peace treaty, the Northern
Territories question has frustrated attempts by the Soviet
Union and Japan to settle permanently the Second World War,
which, officially at least, remains unresolved. Since the
Japanese are concerned about national security, they wish to
solidify the relationship with the Soviet Union, the major
potential military threat to Japan. Japan is also interested
in balancing the successes in Sino- Japanese relations by making
progress toward closer relations with the Soviet Union.
One of Prime Minister Miki's first major diplomatic
decisions was to send Foreign Minister Miyazawa to Moscow to
discuss the state of negotiations toward a peace treaty. The
joint announcement contained only vague references to an "ex-
change of views both on questions of Soviet- Japanese relations
2 A-
and on some international problems of mutual interest." The
Japanese desire to include specific references to the terri-
torial problem in the Japan- Soviet Announcement met with strong
^Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), January 25,
1975.
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resistance, and such references were left out. 26
The Soviet Union next proposed that a treaty of good neigh-
borliness and cooperation be concluded immediately, in spite of
the deadlock over the peace treaty. 26 This would bypass the
necessity of solving the territorial problem, by continuing to
shelve it until conclusion of a formal peace treaty. Further-
more, a friendship treaty would strengthen the Soviet position
in East Asia and, most importantly, would provide leverage
against the People's Republic of China. Japan immediately re-
jected the proposal, leaving negotiations at a stalemate.
Plans for Japanese economic cooperation in the develop-
ment of the vast eastern region of the Soviet Union have been
actively considered since the first meeting, in 1966, of the
27Japanese-Soviet Joint Economic Cooperation Committee. The
first substantive results of the Committee's work were the
1968 Amur River timber agreement and the 1970 Vrangel Port
facilities development agreement.
In the spring of 1974 a package deal was initiated in-
volving Japanese capital loans of approximately 1 billion
^5 ibid . Prime Minister met with similar resistance during
his summit meeting with the Soviets in 1973. See The New York
Times
,
October 10, 1973.
26 Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), February 22,
1.975
.
^Hitchcock, "Joint Development of Siberia," p. 283.
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dollars for coal, gas, and timber projects. 28 Specific memo-
randa involving coal and forestry resources were signed in May
and July respectively. There still remain serious constraints
on the final terms of major oil and gas projects, since they
require a heavy commitment of Japanese funds. Japan is wary
of the concessionary loan terms asked by the Soviet Union.
There have also been disagreements over prices of Siberian
resources. Japan has complained that the Russians want inter-
est rates as low as those given to developing nations, while
demanding prices higher than Japan pays for Australian coal or
Middle East oil. 29 Japan is also suspicious of the accuracy
of Soviet technical estimates. Japanese surveying teams are
not allowed to do their own studies at the oil, gas, and coal
sites to determine the investment risk. The Soviet Union
prefers to manage the projects without direct Japanese partici-
_ . 30pation.
At a Joint Economic Cooperation Committee meeting in the
fall of 1974, the Japanese delegation voiced these reservations
to participation in Siberian development by announcing that
involvement in the largest single resource project - the Tyumen
z ^The New York~Times , April 23, 1974.
29 ibid.
30Kiishi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation ip Siberian
Development," Problems of Communism , XXI (May-June 1972), p.
11 .
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oil field - would be "difficult ."31 The underlying political
implications of Siberian development weighed more heavily in
the decision to proceed cautiously than economic uncertainty.
For example, the new railroad line to the Pacific will cross
territory claimed by China. The railroad will add to the
infrastructure and thereby facilitate development in that dis-
puted region, as well as contribute to the Soviet strategic
position as a Pacific power. Japan is worried that taking
part in these projects will be detrimental to her relations
with China, and will compromise her policy of non- involvement
in Sino-Soviet rivalry. A further concern is that the Soviet
Union is interested in obtaining long-term commitments in order
to lock Japan into a dependency upon Siberian resources, which
in turn could be used for political purposes in isolating Japan
from China and advancing Soviet policies in East Asia.
The three issues of Soviet- Japanese relations discussed
so far - the Northern Territories problem, conclusion of a
peace treaty, and Siberian development, in fact Soviet policy
toward Japan in general - are better explained in terms of
Soviet goals in East Asia.
Now that the European Security Conference has ratified
the status quo in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is freer to
Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), November
9
,
1974 .
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concentrate on problems at and around her Asian borders. 32
Soviet interests in East Asia are inextricably tied to China
and the hostilities which surfaced in the early 1960's. The
foremost Asian goal, then, is to protect Soviet territory east
of the Urals, but especially the areas along the Chinese bor-
der. The massive military deployment by both sides attests
to the seriousness attached to the border issue. Other Soviet
interests in East Asia stem from the primary need (1) to
guarantee national security in that part of the world, (2) to
dissuade nations, especially in Southeast Asia, from aligning
with China, (3) to prevent a Sino- Japanese alliance, and (4)
to prevent Chinese predominance on Russia's eastern flank, by
establishing a strong Soviet presence in the Pacific through
expanded diplomatic efforts and naval power.
Soviet efforts to devise a new Asian policy were initi-
ated by General Secretary Brezhnev in June 1969 at the Inter-
national Communist Conference held in Moscow.
For us, the burning problems of the present
international situation do not push into the
background more long-range tasks, especially
the creation of a system of collective
security in those parts of the world where
the threat of the unleashing of a new world
JZThe New York Times, August 28, 1975.
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war and the unleashing of armed conflicts is
centered. ... We think that the course of
events also places on the agenda the task of
creating a system of collective security in
Asia. 33
It is clear from the preceeding quote that, as first proposed
by Brezhnev, the collective security idea lacked substance.
Since then the proposal has not been embellished or developed
by its authors, although it has become one of the most fre-
quently included components of Asian policy statements.
Like the Nixon Doctrine which was introduced a month
later, the Soviet proposal represented an attempt to deal
with changes in international relations in Asia. For the
United States, and Britain as well, the reappraisal of Asian
policy signalled a decreasing willingness to continue direct
involvement in East Asia. For the Soviet Union, new Asian
policy meant just the opposite - an interest in actively
taking advantage of the newly flexible Asian setting. Col-
lective security provided a vehicle for the Soviet Union to
project its influence into East Asia. It was proposed as an
alternative to American policy, embodied in the Nixon Doc-
trine, and as a means of profiting from a combination of the
American failure in Indochina and detente. The objective of
ddQurrent Digest of the Soviet Press [CDSP], XXI, No. 23
(1969), p. 16.
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the collective security proposal was not to eclipse U.S. in-
flu^nce in the region as much as to check the development of
Chinese power.
The proposal has had little success. Only Iran, Afghan-
istan, and the Mongolian People's Republic have formally
approved of the idea, ^ and no nations located on the stra-
tegically important East Asian rim have endorsed the plan.
Although the Soviet Union has enhanced its influence in
Southern Asia, even India has refused to join the Soviet plan.
As long as Chinese hostility to the plan continues - a fore-
gone conclusion since Peking considers the plan to be directed
against China - it will not succeed. The unwillingness of
Asian nations to antagonize China by supporting a collective
security agreement with the Soviet Union will preclude any
substantive results.
The effect of the proposal is to notify the nations of
East Asia of fundamental Soviet interests in the region and
the intention of the Soviet Union to play a more positive role
there. The observation that this general purpose underlies
the specific collective security proposal is supported by the
following excerpt from Prayda .
-^Alexander 0. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collec-
tive Security in Asia," Asian Survey , XIII, No. 12 (1973),
p. 1082.
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Such a security system can probably be created
step by step through both collective and bi-
lateral efforts by states. There is a broad
field of activity for the realization of the
very humane tasks set by the Soviet proposal
on the creation of a collective security sys-
tem in Asia. 35
The Soviet Union is intent upon building a network of support
in East Asia, by whatever means, and probably never expected
to create a system of collective security.
The fact that Soviet policy is newly directed toward East
Asia is in itself a constraint on Japanese foreign policy.
Japan will be important to the Soviet Union only in terms of
relations with China, as long as Japan has no nuclear weapons.
But as a means of establishing a credible diplomatic record
in East Asia, Japan offers attractive possibilities to the
Soviet Union. Although Moscow publicly maintains its oppo-
sition to the Japanese military relationship with the United
States , 36 Tokyo has been notified that the Treaty of Mutual
Security no longer stands in the way of Japanese participation
37
in a Sovie t- sponsored collective security system.
Thus the Soviet Union is attempting to draw Japan into a
relationship which will serve more fundamental Soviet goals in
19.
-^CDSP, XXVI, No. 50 (1975), 10-11.
36phe New York Times , July 15, 1974.
37par Eastern Economic Review, LXXXII (October 22, 1973),
60
East Asia. A March, 1974 article in Izvestia even suggested
that support for Soviet initiatives concerning the region:
would help Japan to establish equal contacts
with the countries in the rest of Asia and
to come to a genuine understanding of the new
Asia; without a correct attitude toward these
countries, Japan will be unable to exist as a
state with a firm and definite position in the
world. °
It is precisely to establish the goals mentioned by Izvestia
that Japan continues to resist Soviet proposals and to treat
with utmost care her diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union.
The People's Republic of China
The solution to Japan's pre-1972 China problem was found
in the external setting, namely the Sino-American rapproche-
ment which freed Japan to normalize relations with Peking.
Geographical proximity, military power, and territorial and
manpower resources dictate that China will play an increasing-
ly important part in Japanese foreign policy in a post-Vietnam
Asia. Relations with China will also continue to be dominated
by external factors, although the Soviet Union has replaced
the United States as the primary consideration. U.S.-U.S.S.R.
military bipolarity remains, as does the importance of the
3»CDSP, XXVI, No. 6 (1974), 10-11.
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United States in the Pacific. However, the detente between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and the United States and China, as
well as the ongoing Sino-Soviet split, have turned Japan's
relations with China into a more regionally defined issue.
Chinese analysis of East Asian international relations is
now based on a perceived threat from the Soviet Union. The
Chinese delegate to the last session of the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific in March, 1975 gave the
following account of the Soviet danger in Asia.
The superpower that claims to be 'socialist'
talks about detente, peace, disarmament and
security everywhere, and most vociferously
at that. But in fact it is this superpower
that is most energetically expanding its
armaments and preparing for war, carrying
out aggression and expansion, threatening
the security of other countries, creating
tensions and contending hard with the other
superpower for hegemony in the Asian-Pacific
region. ^9
The Shanghai Communique of February, 1972, which established
"the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces
and military installations from Taiwan."40 and the removal of
U.S. troops from Indochina, enabled China to concentrate her
energies on a more immediately threatening local rivalry with
Moscow.
39peking Review
,
XVIII, No. 13 (1975), 17.
40The New York Times, February 28, 1972.
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Smo-Soviet hostility will determine the extent to which
Japan s relations with China can improve. An easing of Sino-
Soviet tensions could significantly alter the scope of foreign
policy options for Japan. China would view Japan - not the
U.S. or U.S.S.R. - as the greatest regional threat, based on
ideological differences, the challenge of Japan's economic
power in Southeast Asia, and the technological capability of
exercising the nuclear option. There are no indications, how-
ever, that the Sino-Soviet rift will be quickly or easily nar-
rowed. The vicious ideological recriminations which have shot
back and forth between Moscow and Peking are the most serious
aspect of the problem. Ideological differences tend to leave
less room for compromise when found between groups claiming
the same source of inspiration. In Peking's view, it is much
worse to be a secret capitalist while claiming to be a socialist
(U.S.S.R.), than to be an outright capitalist (U.S.).
Even if ideological arguments were settled, there would
remain a tension bom of geography and heightened by Chinese
claims of some Soviet territory in several regions of the long,
mutual border which divides the two nations. Nationalism would
preclude a reconciliation complete enough to remove the linger-
ing fears of the powerful Soviet military and the increasingly
sophisticated Chinese nuclear weaponry.
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Since Japan occupies a very important strategic position
in East Asia, one of China's goals is to improve relations with
Tokyo as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. The single
sentence dealing with Japan in Chou En-lai's address to the
First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress in
January 1975 expressed the desire to "promote friendly and
good neighborly relations between the two countries.
. . .
"4-1
This is in marked contrast to the former pattern of Chinese
statements about Japanese 'reactionaries' and 'militarists',
especially relating to the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty, which
Peking claimed had become an "alliance spearheaded against the
,.42Asian Peoples. Beginning in January 1972, however, the
Chinese press organs and statements of public officials dropped
all mention of the Security Treaty and significantly reduced
concentration on Japanese militarism. 1^ Although Peking was
certainly reluctant to offend the United States prior to the
historic Nixon visit, the less antagonistic public statements
41Peking Review
,
XVIII, No. 4 (1975), 24.
^People of Asia, Unite and Drive the U.S. Aggressors
out of Asia ! (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970), p. 14.
43osamu Miyoshi, "The Nixon Doctrine in Asia," in East
Asia and the World System, Part I: The Super-Powers and the
Context Adelphi Papers No. 91 (London: IISS, 1972), p. 17.
Miyoshi 's conclusion is confirmed by a context analysis of the
Chinese press done by Shinkichi Eto, from October 1971 to May
1972. "Japan and China-A New Stage?," Problems of Communism ,
XXI (November-December , 1972), p. 4.
64
WGXT6 3.1so intended to open up a new era in Sino— Japanese ire -
lntions
.
In September 1972 Prime Minister Tanaka visited Peking to
begin the new era. Virtually nil major, outstanding problems
were resolved in the Joint Statement^*- resulting from the
tnlks: (1) Jnpnn recognized the P.R.C. 3s "sole legal govern-
ment" of Chinn. (2) Jnpnn nccepted Peking's clnim thnt Tniwnn
is "nn innliennble pnrt of the territory of the People's
Republic of Chinn." (3) Peking renounced its demnnd for wnr
indemnities. (4) The stnte of wnr between the two countries
was terminated, and Japan expressed regret for "causing enor-
mous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war."
(5) Diplomatic relations between Japan and China were estab-
lished immediately, and the Japan-Taiwan treaty of 1952, as
well as diplomatic relations with that government, was ended.
China has gone further than merely halting the attacks on
the U.S.-Japan alliance, by actually lending support to the
continuation of "intimate" relations between the two nations.^5
There are several reasons for the Chinese tacit approval of the
U.s.-Japan Security Treaty. The presence of the United States
9-4"j0 in t statement of the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Government of Japan," in A New Page
in the Annals of Sino- Japanese Relations (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1972), pp. 15-18.
Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), February
1, 1975.
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in Japan acts as a deterrent to the spread of Soviet influence
in East Asia. The continued stationing of U.S. troops in Japan
also precludes the formation of a strong Soviet alliance with
the Japanese which could be turned toward Peking. Furthermore,
as long as Japan relies on the United States for its basic
security, there will be no need for Japan to 'go nuclear',
something China would consider greatly destabilizing to the
East Asian region and injurious to her interests.
A major focus of Chinese foreign policy in the East Asian
and Pacific region is to "oppose the hegemonism of the super-
powers."^ China has consistently warned against superpower
hegemony, and the fact that the phrase quoted here appears in
the preamble of the new Constitution of the People's Republic
of China indicates the permanence of the issue.
Sino-Japanese relations are governed in part by the Chinese
strategy of befriending Japan in order to drive a wedge between
Japan and the Soviet Union. The Chinese fear that Japan will
be drawn into a collective security arrangement with the Soviet
Union, even if only indirectly, through a series of economic
agreements or statements of cooperation and friendship.
One of the Soviet aims in coaxing and coercing
Japan is to put it in the orbit of Soviet
"Asian collective security system." Ever since
46 Peking Review , XVIII, No. 4 (1975), 13.
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Brezhnev contrived this scheme in 1969, the
Kremlin has cast its eyes on Japan.
China has used similar arguments about Soviet ulterior motives
to warn Japan not to participate in Siberian development pro-
. „
48jects
.
China capitalizes on a more emotional issue by strenuously
supporting Japan's claim to the Northern territories.
To make way for their military presence in
the Pacific through the Sea of Japan and
build up hegemony there, the Kremlin's new
tsars for many years have been trying by
hook or by crook to hold on to Japan's
northern territories which they occupy .
^
This support for Japan is consistent with China's own terri-
torial claims against the Soviet Union, but does not represent
any congruence in long term Chinese and Japanese foreign policy
goals. China's diplomatic backing is counterproductive to
Japanese efforts at improving relations with the Soviet Union
which, of course, is China's target.
The current negotiations to conclude a "treaty of peace
and friendship," as mandated by the 1972 Japan-China Joint
Statement, hinge on relations with the Soviet Union. In fact,
disagreements encountered during the negotiation process have
47peking Review
,
XVII, No. 30 (1974), 17.
48peking Review , XVII, No. 33 (1974), 18-19.
49peking Review
,
XVIII, No. 7 (1975), 15.
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more to do with the effect of the treaty on East Asian inter-
national relations than with Sino-Japanese relations. China
has insisted upon including a clause in the treaty which would
warn third parties against attempting to establish hegemony
in East Asia, an obvious reference to the Soviet Union. A
similar statement was placed in the 1972 Joint Statement, 50
although Japan has serious misgivings about agreeing to the
hegemony clause a second time, for fear of a further disrup-
tion in relations with the Soviet Union. The impasse in
treaty negotiation with China, which resulted from disagree-
ment on the hegemony clause, indicates the constraints on
Japan's international relations, and the often diplomatically
vulnerable position from which Japan must support its foreign
policy initiatives.
Since normalizing diplomatic relations, China and Japan
have signed agreements on trade, aviation, navigation, and
fisheries, leaving only the peace treaty yet to be completed
from among the tasks mentioned in the 1972 Joint Statement. 5 ^
It is evident from the negotiations and final documents, however,
bUxhe pertinent sentence of the Joint Statement follows:
"Neither of the two countries should seek
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and
each country is opposed to efforts by any
other country or group to establish such
hegemony.
"
51Peking Review , XVII, No. 47 (1974), p. 4.
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that China has skillfully used the new contacts with Japan to
achieve more important foreign policy goals. The aviation
agreement, for example, was designed to further isolate Taiwan.
As a condition for concluding the agreement, Peking required a
Japanese public statement asserting the non-national status of
the Taiwanese national flag carrier airline, China Airlines. 52
Taiwan responded immediately by banning all Japan Air Line air-
craft from Taiwan s air space. Although air flights have since
been resumed, by the creation of dummy airline companies to
avoid the national flag issue, China had won a diplomatic
victory.
The completion of a new pipeline from China's Taching oil
field to a tanker terminal at Chinwangtao, a Yellow Sea port
within easy reach of Japan, indicates China's intention to
develop her position as an oil exporter. In 1974 Japan im-
ported only 3% of her oil needs from China, although the volume
bought from China is expected to double in 1975.“*^ An expanded
oil output used to buy Japanese technology could establish a
5Z5TT statement to the press, Foreign Minister Ohira
said that, since 1972, Japan "has not considered the flag mark
of the aircraft belonging to Taiwan as something that repre-
sents a so-called national flag." The New York Times , April
21, 1974.
53The New York Times
,
February 10, 1975.
54The New York Times, March 11, 1975.
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permanent interest in stable relations for both Peking and
Tokyo. However, Japan is already the largest source of Chinese
imports, and the policy of self-sufficiency may prevent
Japan from vastly increasing its economic ties to China.
Historical and cultural ties, trade compatibility, close
geographical proximity, and most importantly, the absence of
any serious, outstanding issues, indicates that Japan will
improve relations with China faster than with the Soviet Union.
Although the present state of relations with China and the
Soviet Union supports this observation, Japan is well aware
of the need to maintain a minimum degree of equilibrium in
dealing with the two neighbors. The diplomatic effort needed
to stay out of Sino-Soviet disputes and, at the same time,
improve relations with both nations may not be available to
the Japanese, thereby canceling the flexibility provided to
Japan by the Sino-Soviet rift. Under the present circumstances
it will be extremely difficult for Japan to establish a stable
basis for continuing relations with either nation. This is due
to the simple fact that in a triangular relationship, a move by
any two sides automatically affects the third.
5 5japan External Trade Organization, White Paper on Inter-
national Trade , Japan 1973 (n.p. Japan External Trade Organiza-
tion, 1973), p. 52. In 1971, Japan was responsible, for 20.27o
of China's external trade.
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Japan and the So-called Asian Quadrilateral
The increasingly flexible interaction of major power
interests in East Asia has prompted the use of the term 'Asian
quadrilateral' to describe an emerging regional balance of
power. A four-power balance, however, is not an accurate des-
cription of the Asian milieu to which Japan's foreign policy
must respond. To begin with, latent bipolarity still exists.
The United States and Soviet Union will remain the only two
military giants; this factor cannot simply be dismissed, even
though we are currently enjoying a period of relaxed tensions.
China places great emphasis on her growing military capability
and, as a nuclear power, commands respect from the two super-
powers. On the other hand, Japan has chosen not to compete
militarily, hence cannot hold one comer of a four-power
balance. China, the Soviet Union, and the United States con-
verge in Northeast Asia at Japan's doorstep. Japan can either
develop her own military or depend on external military sup-
port. Since the latter course was chosen, a quadrilateral
pattern cannot exist.
Soviet goals in Asia are suggestive of a containment policy
directed at China. However, the notion of a balance of power
implied in the quadrilateral is in reality replaced by a Soviet
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desire for predominance. Moscow would like to insure its
security in the East; a mechanical balance of power could not
satisfy this goal. There are other fixed points in the rela-
tions of the major powers, which place constraints upon the
operation of a flexible, balance of power. The U.S.- Japan
relationship has undergone adjustments in recent years. How-
ever, that relationship will remain a fairly constant part of
East Asian international relations. Given the fundamental
nature of the dispute, Sino-Soviet relations will likely re-
main hostile.
The formation of more flexible relations among the four
major powers in Asia was a function of existing rivalries
rather than a permanent balance of power. China has not
acknowledged any basic changes in the East Asian regional
setting, but has merely chosen to deal with the lesser evil
(U.S.) in order to strengthen her position against the major
adversary (U.S.S.R.). Similarly, the existing ideological
differences, both within the Communist bloc, and, between
Japan and the United States on the one hand, and the Communist
nations, limits the development of a truly quadrilateral struc-
ture.
The quadrilateral, as a conceptual model of East Asian
international relations, cannot account for the root causes
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underlying the vicissitudes of Japan's regional environment.
Also, reliance on balance of power is not supported by the al-
liances and rivalries, some overlapping, which make up major
power relations in East Asia: (1) sino-Soviet rivalry, (2)
U.S. -Japan alliance, (3) U.S., U.S.S.R., P.R.C. triangle, (4)
Japan, U.S.S.R., P.R.C. triangle.
The importance of Korea is its crucial strategic position
between the four major powers, no one of which could tolerate
a united Korea under a hostile government. Japan's relations
with South Korea have been severely strained due to the Kim
Dae Jung affair and the assassination of President Park's wife
during an attempt on Park's life by a Korean resident of
5 6Japan. Diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea
were not established for two decades following World War II.
Japan refused to recognize the South Korean government as the
government of all Korea, keeping open the possibilities of
dealing with the North. The South Korean position was that
Japan could not recognize the legitimacy of the North Korean
bbphe New YoriT~Times
,
June 16, 1974; August 19, 1974;
September 13, 1974. Kim Dae Jung ran against President Park
in the 1971 election. In August, 1973, he was kidnapped from
Tokyo by South Korean agents and returned to Korea to stand
trial. The attempted assassination was carried out by Mun
Se Kwang, a lifetime Korean resident of Japan who speaks only
Japanese, and who apparently has accomplices in Japan.
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government without causing the abrogation of its treaty with
the South. Sufficiently ambiguous phraseology was used to
allow both Japan and South Korea their own interpretations.
Although Prime Minister Miki said that it is still "premature
for Japan to recognize the People's Democratic Republic of
Korea."57 Japan has maintained unofficial contact with North
Korea and hopes to play a constructive role in the stabiliza-
S 8tion of the Korean peninsula.
The growing tensions in Korea and the recent reaffirma-
tion by the United States of its commitment to protect South
Korea5 ^ suggest that familiar elements of post-war inter-
national relations in East Asia remain. Japan's interest in
stability in Northeast Asia will be overshadowed by ongoing
competition among the other three major powers. Any war on
the Korean peninsula would automatically involve the United
States, and in turn implicate Japan. Japanese foreign policy
options are limited by this situation.
Therefore, the Asian quadrilateral among major powers is
a myth. The new flexibility in East Asian international rela-
57japan Times "Weekly (International Edition), February
8, 1975.
58North Korea has already utilized the informal relations
with Japan to send messages to the United States. The New
York Times
,
August 10, 1975.
5
9
japan Times Weekly (International Edition), September
6, 1975.
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tions can only describe certain levels of interaction, and is
more appropriate to the position of the lesser powers. 60
k^For the balance of power approach to East Asian inter-
national relations, see T. B. Millar, "The 'Asian Quadri-
lateral': An Australian View," Australian Outlook
,
XXVII,
No. 2 (1973), pp. 134-139, and Hedley Bull, "The New Balance
of Power in Asia and the Pacific," Foreign Affairs
,
IL, No.
4 (1971), pp. 669-681.
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CHAPTER IV
JAPAN AND SOUTH EAST ASIA:
THE DEVELOPING NATIONS
The 'North-South' Problem
Japan's relations with the developing nations of South-
east Asia are directly related to the 'North- South
'
problem.
Increasingly, the critical division in the world is between
the industrialized nations, concentrated in the Northern
Hemisphere (Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Western
Europe) and the poor nations, concentrated around the equator
and in the Southern Hemisphere. As the East-West division of
the cold war becomes more complicated and less well-defined,
the ' North- South
'
problem comes into focus.
Japan's sensitivity to the polarization of the 'have' and
'have-not' nations stems from a need to deal extensively with
both groups. Culturally, historically, and geographically,
Japan has always identified more with Asian neighbors than with
the capitals of Western Europe. Yet, as the only industrially
advanced Asian nation, Japan became a member of the Western,
rich-nation economic organizations during the 1960 's and the
first non-Western member of OECD. Japan's position in East
Asia is beset with contradictions, not the least of which is
76
how to establish a credible 'Asian-ness' and still continue
the necessarily close relations with the West. Japan has
accomplished her post-war goal of catching up with the West.
The competitiveness of the Japanese economy has even led to
its characterization as one of three pillars of Western eco-
nomic strength. Now, a stable basis for relations with the
developing nations must be found. This will be a more formi-
dable goal for Japan to achieve.
Japan's unique position between North and South makes it
awkward to maintain close relations with both at the same time.
At the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) in 1964, Japanese delegates attended strategy
sessions of both the industrialized nations and the southern
coalition of less developed nations, but were asked to leave
the sessions of the latter group. ^ This event indicates three
of Japan's foreign policy problems: (1) isolation, (2) finding
a suitable regional role, and (3) improving relations with the
developing nations. The latter two are inseparable, because
developing a mutually acceptable relationship with Southeast
Asia is the key to successful relations with developing nations
ij. Alexander Caldwell, "The Evolution of Japanese Eco-
nomic Cooperation 1950-1970," in Pacific Basin Development:
The American Interests , ed. by Harold B. Malmgren (Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), p. 41.
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in other regions. Former Foreign Minister Kimura pointed out
that there can be no such thing as Japanese foreign policy
toward developing countries without close relations with
2Southeast Asian nations." Thus the search for a solution to
the 'North-South' problem, as well as a stable Asian role,
will compel the Japanese to concentrate on Southeast Asian
relations
.
Foreign Aid
Japan's reemergence into Southeast Asia after the war was
initially spurred by the reparations agreements concluded with
3
nine countries of the area. These agreements did not repre-
sent a foreign policy but an obligation written into the 1951
San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ironically, the reparations pay-
ments were instrumental in establishing Japan as an economic
4
power in Southeast Asia. There were also political factors
involved, since the payments improved the post-war image of
Japan. Furthermore, a regional focus of foreign aid was estab-
2Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), July 27, 1974.
3Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan chose not
to present claims to Japan. The nine countries are: the
Philippines, Burma, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia. An agreement was also reached
with South Korea on reparations payments.
^Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1970), p. 28.
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lished which continues to shape Japan's approach to Southeast
Asia
.
The 1960's was a period of transition during which the
earlier, uncoordinated reparations agreements developed into
more self-conscious efforts at building a foreign aid program
as an integral component of Japanese foreign policy. The
stimulus for such a change came from growing criticism of
Japanese economic policy in Southeast Asia and the inevitable
political ramifications of the spiraling economic involvement.
Japan's foreign aid policy is a key area of her foreign policy
since the core of the 1 North- South
'
problem is contained in
the aid issue.
One of the first challenges to Japan's aid program, which
carried with it the moral force of an international organiza-
tion, was the goal of 1% of national income as the minimum
annual net flow to developing countries, set by the first
UNCTAD. ^ The fact that Japan was the newest member of the
rich nations of the developed world, the only Asian member,
and the fastest growing economic power, placed special emphasis
on Japan's aid-giving status, especially in the eyes of the
developing nations of Southeast Asia, which collectively would
be most affected by the specifics of Japan's aid policy. Later
bibid
. , p . 144.
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conferences established a higher resource flow guideline of 1%
of gross national product. In 1965 the Development Assistance
Committee of OECD called for an improvement in the quality of
foreign aid by suggesting a goal of
. 7% of GNP for official
development assistance, or the more beneficial element of the
fl
outflow which could more accurately be labeled as 'aid. ' More
recently DAC criticism of Japan concerned large loans to Iran.
Japan was reprimanded for offering loans to oil rich nations.
^
It is difficult for Japan to balance the foreign policy gains
to be made by selective aid-giving with the more general neces-
sity of adhering to the guidelines established by the developing
nations within international organizations.
Southeast Asia receives the largest share of Japanese aid -
g
nearly 307> of the total. The Philippines and Indonesia top the
list of recipient countries in this region. Central and South
America and the Middle East have begun to receive larger per-
centages of the total aid package, reflecting not only the oil
crisis and the expansion of capital used for resource projects,
but also aspects of Japanese foreign policy developed during
6
"japan's Foreign Policy," Australian Foreign Affairs
Record (May, 1973), p. 304.
Tjapan Times Weekly (International Edition), January
18, 1975.
^Radha P. Sinha, "Japan's 'Aid' to Developing Countries,
World Development, II, No. 8 (1974), 17.
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the Tanaka prime ministership. Although not a carefully de-
f ir^fid policy
,
resources diplomacy followed from the need to
diversify the sources of crucial raw materials and lessen vul-
nerability. One obvious result of the concern about exces-
sively concentrated economic commitments has been a slow de-
cline in the importance of Southeast Asia. As sources of raw
materials are diversified, so too will the pattern of foreign
aid be shifted.
Quantitatively, Japanese net outflow of resources is
second only to the United States. The Japanese share in global
assistance has risen from 3.4% in 1962 to nearly 14% ten years
later. ^ In 1973 Japan more than doubled the 1962 $2730 mil-
lion figure by offering $5840 million in aid.^ For the first
time, Japan surpassed the goal of 1% of GNP by reaching a
1.427o outflow. In the ten years from 1962 to 1972 Japanese
assistance to developing countries increased 900%.^
The previous figures are not nearly as impressive when
the qualitative aspect of aid is considered. The fact is,
that even the term ‘aid* is of questionable validity when ap-
plied to much of the net outflow of Japanese resources. Of-
ficial development assistance (ODA) , or resources of a conces-
^ Ihid
. , p . 15 .
Japan Report
,
January 16, 1975, p. 5.
11-Sin ha, "Japan's 'Aid' to Developing Countries," p. 15.
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sionary nature assisting development, such as grants or long-
tern loans, was only 17% of the total outflow in 1973, down
from 22% in 1972. 12 As a percentage of GNP
,
Japan's ODA was
130.25 in 1973, far short of the DAC goal of .7% and far down
in the list of OECD nations. This poor showing in the quality
of aid is highlighted by the fact that from 1968 to 1972, 35%
of Japan's net outflow was export credits, as compared with
16%. for West Germany and 5% for the United States.
Japan's aid pattern is an integral part of the total eco-
nomic strategy of dealing with resource needs and the neces-
sity of trading to achieve foreign exchange with which to buy
more resources. Much of the aid is tied to the purchase of
Japanese goods. Often export development and foreign aid be-
come difficult to distinguish. The result is that Japan bene-
fits from the aid as much if not more than the recipient. For
example, development assistance categories important to de-
veloping nations, such as agriculture (4.47.), social infra-
structure (2.9%,), and technical assistance (5.5%) received
much less priority than energy and transport (20.4%,) and cur-
rent export financing (40.4%,).^ Therefore the increased
12 lbid .
13japan Report
,
January 16, 1975, p. 5.
14-sinha, "Japan's Aid to Developing Countries", p. 18.
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figures for overall Japanese aid only reveal increased trade
investment, not necessarily a real plan to cooperate with
the developing nations in solving the pressing issues of food
and development.
The close relationship between Japanese foreign aid, re-
sources procurement, and trade development has turned aid into
a controversial political issue. The speed and manner with
which Japan answers the charges of the developing world and
softens the terms of aid, will determine Japan's future rela-
tions with Southeast Asia.
In response to the uncoordinated aid policy and to charges
that aid serves only Japan's economic interests, the government
created a new Agency for International Cooperation,^ which will
absorb the functions of several other groups and offices. How-
ever, the two major governmental sources of loans for overseas
projects^ will continue to operate independently, indicating
the cosmetic nature of the new arrangement. A more productive
proposal, although still only at the planning stage, is to es-
tablish consulting offices in six Southeast Asian countries to
work closely with local people in solving mutual problems re-
^-5japan Repor~ August 16, 1974.
l^These are the Import-Export Bank of Japan and the Over-
seas Economic Cooperation Fund. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia ,
p. 107.
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suiting from Japan's economic presence. 17 Such a policy is at
least the beginning of a unified way of thinking about rela-
tions with Southeast Asia. If Japan does not design positive
aid programs based on broader political and regional concerns,
aid will continue to play a negative role by arousing the ani-
mosities of those it is supposed to help.
Multilateral Approaches to Southeast Asia
No longer can politics be separated from economics. Japan's
political initiatives affect trade relations and vice versa.
Japan can no longer ignore the political repercussions resulting
from the transfer of industrial pollution to the developing
nations. Charges of neo-colonialism levied against Japanese
multinational corporations must be handled in a political set-
ting. However, Japan can not pursue a political leadership role,
or any position of predominance. Simply stated, Japan's foreign
policy toward Southeast Asia must assume responsibility but
avoid domination. Policy remaining within these bounds can be
most effectively accomplished in a multilateral context.
Participation in the founding of the Asian Development Bank
was a major Japanese effort to assume a responsible position in
the solution of regional problems. Although there were thirty-
1/F
Japan Times Weekly , March 1, 1975.
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one original members in 1966, Japan pledged 20% of the first
$1 billion capital fund.^ A Japanese was chosen to be first
ADB President. However, on the issue of where the ADB head-
quarters should be located, hard Japanese lobbying was unable
to convince the membership that Tokyo would be the best place,
and Manila was chosen instead. The prevailing view at the
time, among the developing nations, that the ADB should be an
Asian, not a Japanese, institution,"^ suggests that Japan over-
stepped the limits of political responsibility by attempting
to develop constructive initiatives into a position of leader-
ship. Even though only symbolic, such a position was not
tolerated.
Also in 1966, Japan was the principal organizer of the
Annual Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of
Southeast Asia. Although its functions are primarily eco-
nomic, Japan proposed the annual conference in light of polit-
ical instability in Southeast Asia, with the hope that economic
economic development would have a stabilizing effect. The
Eighth Ministerial Conference was held in Tokyo in October,
1973, attended by all Southeast Asian nations except North
iaLangdon, Japan's Foreign Policy , p. 187.
19Caldwell, "Japanese Economic Cooperation," p. 43.
20 Ibid.
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Vietnam, including normally neutral Burma, and Australia and
o 1
New Zealand.
Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Southeast Asia in January,
1974 triggered demonstrations in Bangkok and severe riots in
Jakarta. The cause was alleged economic domination and ex-
ploitation. 22 Figures for 1971, however, reveal that in the
five ASEAN nations, the United States had invested $1662 mil-
lion while Japan's direct investment was only $489 million. 22
It is not the economic presence alone which sparks the enmity
toward Japan, but the visibility of the Japanese investments,
concentrated in consumer goods, and therefore subject to high
r\ /
levels of advertisement. Thus the real problems may be re-
lated to style and image, and the inherent asymmetry between
Japan and the nations of Southeast Asia. Commenting on the
Tanaka trip, Richard Halloran of the New York Times concluded
"that the issues causing friction between Japanese and Southeast
Asians were not economic but political, psychological and
25
nationalist .
"
ZiJapan Report
,
February 16, 1974 (special supplement),
p. 1-2.
22The New York Times
,
January 21, 1974.
23Yoshihiro Tsurumi, "Multinational Spread of Japanese
Firms and Asian Neighbor's Reactions," a paper submitted to
Yale University Conference on "The Multinational Corporation
as an Instrument of Development-Political Considerations,
(mimeo), p. 3.
24 Ibid
.
,
p. 28-29.
2
2
The New York Times, January 21, 1974.
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The formation of ASEAN in 1967 represented a departure
from earlier attempts at regional organization. Indonesia's
participation erased the apparent Western bias of earlier
O £
groups . The significance of the new regionalism is that
ASEAN is the first "general, indigenous, and politically
neutral" organization in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN nations
talk collectively to international organizations such as GATT,
and there is a permanent ASEAN office in Brussels to deal with
the European Economic Community. Beyond these small begin-
nings, the group of five nations has made little progress toward
integrating the region's economy or forming a supranational
political authority. The point here is that ASEAN indicates a
growing political awareness among the nations of Southeast Asia,
which will be an increasingly important factor of the regional
setting. It was no coincidence that Prime Minister Tanaka's
Southeast Asian tour led him to Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur,
Singapore, and Jakarta, the five ASEAN capitals.
zt)Two members of the Association of Southeast Asia
(ASA) - Thailand and the Philippines were linked to SEATO; the
third - Malaysia - was closely associated with Britain.
^Bernard K. Gordon, "Common Defense Considerations and
Integration in Southeast Asia," in Regional International
Organizations: Structures and Functions, ed. by Paul Tharp,
Jr. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 243.
28pick Wilson, "Economic Co-operation within ASEAN,"
Pacific Community , V, No. 1 (1973), 81.
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In 1971 the ASEAN governments proposed that Southeast Asia
be recognized as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality free
from any form or manner of interference from outside powers."29
The goal has not been realized, although the end of hostilities
in Indochina led to renewed efforts among the ASEAN nations to
draft a more constructive proposal. 30 Japan favors the idea
since stability in the region would be enhanced. It is clear
that the slow but steady maturity of ASEAN precludes a heightened
Japanese presence in Southeast Asia. The proposal indicates the
desire to rid the areAxjf disruptive major power influence - and
this would include Japan as well.
Internal conflicts continue to plague ASEAN, such as the
ongoing rift between the Philippines and Malaysia. However,
ASEAN may act as a deterrent to external interference in the
area. Two ASEAN nations have taken steps to weaken or end the
military relationship with the United States. There is also a
discussion among ASEAN members of expanding the regional organi-
31
zation to include Burma and the nations of Indochina. An
expanded ASEAN would be a political entity better equipped to
confront Japan on specific economic issues. On the other hand,
the mere existence of the organization may force Japan to develop
29 Ibid
. , p . 80
.
30The New York Times , May 10, 1975; May 14, 1975.
3
^The New York Times, May 14, 1975.
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a more comprehensive, regional approach to the solution of
problems, in a multilateral context.
Japan's economic interests and diplomatic efforts are
globally diversified and will become more so. This trend will
preclude any exclusive relationship with Southeast Asia, even
though 24.27o of Japan's total exports and 20.87, of its total
imports are with the region. 32 Japan's Southeast Asian policy
will be watched closely by the Group of 77 developing nations.
The 'North-South' problem is potentially one of Japan's most
difficult diplomatic issues. If the advantage should continue
to shift in favor of resource-holding nations, the state of
relations with Southeast Asia will become even more crucial.
It is important to note, however, that Japan must deal with
her southern neighbors as an outsider.
The Pacific Basin and Australia
The heterogeneous nature of the nations in the East Asian
area makes it difficult for Japan to establish a regionally
based foreign policy. The suspicion of Japan's economic power
is linked to memories of a Japanese dominated Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In the 1970's Japan is too big and
J
2
Japan External Trade Organization, White Paper on Inter -
national Trade, Japan 1974, p. 9-10.
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ths na-tions of Southeast Asia too small foir a mutually satis-
factory relationship. An alternative approach to Japan's
'North- South' problem in East Asia would be to deal with the
developing nations as a member of a group of nations with simi-
lar interests in maintaining and improving relations in this
area
.
A 'Pacific Basin' group
. One possibility is for Japan to
coordinate policy with the developed nations of the Pacific
Basin - the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
A leading exponent of this idea has concentrated on the eco-
nomic benefits. The U.S., Australia, and Canada are three
of Japan's leading resource suppliers, and the U.S. and Canada
are major markets for Japanese products. Kiyoshi Koj ima argues
that the five nations have common goals in promoting economic
integration. His chief concern is protectionism in the United
States and the Common Market. By drawing the United States
into a Pacific Free Trade Area, and thereby providing a means
of combating the European Economic Community, Koj ima reasons
3 /
that both trouble spots would be alleviated.
b^Kiyoshi Kojima, Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area
(London: MacMillan, 1972).
^Kiyoshi Kojima, "Chances for a Pacific Free Trade Area,"
Intereconomics
,
No. 6 (June 1972), p. 184.
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All the nations in question are developed, capitalistic
economies; all are ideologically linked with the West; all have
similar political systems with free elections and representa-
tive assemblies. Furthermore, a Pacific Basin group would be
in an ideal position to coordinate comprehensive aid programs
for Southeast Asia. Japan's isolated position in dealing with
the Southeast Asian nations would be buttressed. However, the
only ongoing consultation among the Pacific Basin nations is
in the form of a privately organized Pacific Basin Economic
Cooperation Council set up in 1968.^
Even if the other nations were willing, serious partici-
pation in a Pacific Basin group would be beyond the bounds of
plausible Japanese foreign policy. Although there are barriers
to close regional ties in East Asia, Japan cannot ignore her
neighbors. Japan is located in East Asia and cannot but have
an effect on the economic, political, and strategic spheres of
East Asian international relations. Formation of a Pacific
Basin group would exacerbate Japanese efforts to improve her
image as an East Asian nation, determined to bridge the gap
between North and South. Also Japan must diversify sources of
dbwarren Reed, "An Era of Interdependence: Australia and
Japan Today, "The Japan Interpreter , IX, No. 1 (1974), 48.
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raw materials and markets for exports, rather than consolidate
them.
Australia
. Expansion of relations with Australia is a
more credible means of establishing a regional policy, which
does not disturb the integrity of Japan's requirements else-
where in the world. Australia is in the process of changing
the focus of economic and political ties from Western Europe
to East Asia. Besides the obvious economic compatibility of
Australian natural resources and Japanese technology and
finished goods, the two nations, as the two major developed
countries of the region, are in a good position to initiate
joint programs of foreign aid. While addressing a joint
Ministerial meeting in October, 1973, Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam noted the reason for Australian- Japanese cooperation:
"There are few nations in the world whose fundamental interests
O (1
coincide so clearly as those of Japan and Australia."
Australia's recognition of China, unwillingness to be
linked to the anti- communis t image of the now moribund Asian
and Pacific Council, and desire to maintain friendly relations
with all nations in East Asia, parallel Japan's foreign policy
in the region. Negotiations were begun in 1973 for a treaty
which would develop the political relations between Japan and
^The New York Times, October 31, 1973.
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3 7Australia. This alliance is one of the few open to Japan
which would not irritate other elements of the general region,
especially if designed to coordinate foreign aid to Southeast
Asia, and not as a threat to China. At the 1973 meeting, Prime
Minister Whitlam also said:
As the two most developed industrial nations
of the West Pacific, we share a common
interest in the well-being of our region, so
populous and so poor. We have a common
interest in seeing that our region does not
become an area for competition or confronta-
O O
tion between the great powers.-30
Closer relations between Japan and Australia based on these
principles would serve Chinese interests by implicitly deter-
ring Soviet- sponsored collective security in East Asia.
Regardless of the advantages of a broader alliance, the
focus of the relationship remains economic. 9.17, of Japan's
39imports come from Australia, now the second largest indi-
vidual supplier, after the United States. Australia is a
medium sized market accepting 3.27, of Japanese exports in
1973.^° The economic ties with Australia are hampered by a
staggering degree of resource dependency. For example, Japan
buys 507o of industrial coal, manganese, and bauxite, and 367,
3
7
Ibid .
3
8
ibid .
39japan External Trade Organization, White Paper on Inter -
national Trade, Japan 1974 , p. 10.
40 Ibid
. , p . 9
.
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or iron ore from Australia. 41 Australia has been unwilling to
grant further Japanese investment in resource-related indus-
tries
,
fearing excessive Japanese control of mineral properties
in Australia.
The annual Ministerial Committee meeting is still the only
formal contact to guide bilateral relations. Without a more
stable foundation on which to conduct hard economic bargaining,
more constructive Japanese-Australian relations are unlikely.
Conclusions
We return to the three questions posed at the outset of
chapter III. First, will East Asia become the primary focus
of Japan's foreign policy? Japan's interests cannot be satis-
fied, and in fact would be damaged by a purely regional foreign
policy. Japanese economic power is too dispersed and has too
many requirements to remain healthy in a primarily Asian set-
ting. Former Foreign Minister Ohira spoke of the dangers to
Japan "posed by the rise - both in developed and developing
regions - of economic nationalism, protectionism, regionalism,
42
and exclusive trading arrangements." Therefore Japan cannot
take part in regional strategies to the detriment of, in many
4iKoji Nakamura, "Australia Gives Nothing Away," Far
Eastern Economic Review , LXXXII, No. 44 (1973), 39.'
4^Japan Report , June 16, 1974, p. 4.
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cases, equally necessary relations in other parts of the world.
Japan is an alien in Southeast Asia, and an important strategic
element of major power calculations in Northeast Asia. There
are no natural partners for Japan in Asia. This is not to
suggest that Japan will not have a role to play in East Asia -
rather that the region cannot be the foundation upon which
Japan's position in the world is based. It will be necessary,
however, for Japan to develop a closer understanding with the
nations in East Asia. The lack of recognizable goals and the
appearance of a drifting Japanese foreign policy is particu-
larly unsettling to the countries of Southeast Asia which are
most affected by economic relations with Japan.
Second, how will the position in Asia affect Japan's
global foreign policy options? The regional setting has im-
portant extra-regional implications. Relations with Southeast
Asia will have an impact on Japan's dealings with developing
nations world-wide. In Northeast Asia, the line between the
regional and global implications of the interaction of the
major powers is hardly distinguishable. Japan's global foreign
policy is weakened by the absence of a firm regional basis for
diplomatic strength. One observer has written that "Japan's
lack of a regional basis is without doubt her weakest point.
4JKosaka. Options for Japan's Foreign Policy , p. 24.
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Japan's foreign policy options globally will be affected by the
weak regional position. Japan is important to Asia; the solu-
tion to regional problems will have to involve Japan to a
greater extent. However, Japan will not be able to extract
from East Asia support for diplomatic ventures elsewhere.
will Japan pursue an Asian leadership position or
opt for partnership with the West? Japan's interests in East
Asia - stability, open and safe waterways, access to a constant
supply of raw materials and stable markets for Japanese goods,
and freedom from disputes of the major powers - are in no way
divergent from global foreign policy goals. Japan's interests
may not coincide with either alternative. Japan has been des-
cribed as a "multi- dimensional power," both Asian and Western,
with truly global interests. Such a characterization explains
Japan's unique position in East Asia. Japan is isolated from
participation in East Asian politics as an insider, yet the
region is vitally important to Japanese contact with the world.
Japan's foreign policy has moved beyond geography, although
in the foreseeable future East Asia will present the Japanese
with their most difficult foreign policy problems. There are
constraints against being primarily a Western partner or pri-
marily an Asian leader. Japan will have to find a third
alternative
.
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CHAPTER V
THE JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA
Japan is approaching a crossroads in defense policy.
The decisions regarding the future disposition of the Mutual
Security Treaty with the United States and the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty will be as important as any in defining the type
of relationship Japan chooses to build with other nations.
Will Japan decide to continue as the only economic superpower
lacking a corresponding military potential, or will Japan opt
for an independent defense capacity with the accompanying
decision to manufacture nuclear weapons? Although the existing
security dilemma is much more complex, decisions Japan will
make in the next few years will either reject the military as
an instrument of foreign policy, as is now done, or begin the
development of a Japanese controlled military potential with
applications beyond Japanese territory.
The following issues will be discussed in this chapter:
(1) the Self-Defense Forces, (2) the strategic environment,
the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty, and (4) nuclear weapons.
The Self-Defense Forces
A consideration of the Japanese military must begin with
the 'Renunciation of War' Article from the Japanese Constitu-
tion.
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Article 9 . Aspiring sincerely to an inter-
national peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as
a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
or use of force as means of settling inter-
national disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces
as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.
The fact that there do exist land, sea and air forces in spite
of the Constitution is explained by their designation as
'self-defense' forces. "The inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence," as guaranteed in article 51 of the
United Nations Charter is affirmed in the preamble to the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and forms the legal
basis for the Japanese military. Nevertheless, Article 9 is
an effective limitation on the role of the armed forces.
In 1956 the Diet created a National Defense Council to
give advice to tt^ Cabinet on security matters. The Council
established the first Basic National Defense Policy, which in
part was
to gradually build up effective forces to
provide the minimum degree of defense neces-
sary in accord with national strength and
national sentiment.
^
Although the policy was noncommital, it did indicate that
Japan would "gradually" increase its conventional armed forces,
1Lanedon. Japan's Foreign Policy , p. 37.
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leaving open tine question of tine future role of the military.
In accordance with this policy, the Defense Council designed
the First Defense Buildup Plan which called for $1.2 billion
for domestic production of weapons, including domestic assembly
of jet fighters, over a three-year period ending in 1960. The
plan was also designed to replace the American ground troops
being withdrawn with a larger Japanese ground force.
The Second Defense Buildup Plan (1962-1966) was devised
to replace outdated equipment and increase the size of the
O
three forces, ground, sea, and air. $3.9 billion was spent
on the Air Self-Defense Force fighter plane, the F104J, expan-
sion of domestic production of modem arms, purchase of ad-
vanced air defense systems including Nike and Hawk surface-to-
air missiles, and, for the Maritime Self-Defense force, heli-
3
copter carriers and anti-submarine escort vessels.
Whereas the aim of the first two buildup plans was to
improve the armed forces quantitatively, the goal for the third
and fourth plans was to deal with the qualitative aspects. A
five-year plan from 1967 to 1972 stressed research, advanced
training, and a strengthened air and submarine defense. An
2James William Morley, "Economism and Balanced Defense,"
in Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970*5 , ed. by James
William Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972),
p . 11
.
3"The Evolution of Japan's Defense Plans," The Japan
Interpreter, VIII, No. 2 (1973), 213.
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important aspect of the third plan was the achievement of the
goal of 907o domestic production of all arms, unaided by the
United States. The Japanese policy was to continue to rely
on the U.S. security treaty, but to place Japanese conventional
forces on a more independent basis. The cost of the third plan
was $6.5 billion, 5 or nearly double the cost of the second plan.
The fourth and current five-year plan, which will run
through 1976, is projected to cost $15 billion, for new fighter
planes and an increase in maritime forces to enable adequate
protection of Okinawa, returned to full Japanese administra-
tion in 1972. However, serious economic problems may prevent
completion of the procurement schedule by the March 1977 dead-
6line. The present Defence Agency Director Michita Sakata has
already set in motion the drafting of a defense program to fol-
low the present one . ^ Present policy suggests that Japan will
continue to develop and manufacture equipment for its modem
conventional armed forces.
Even though modernization and expansion programs, along
with inflation, have raised the 1974 defense budget to more than
^Ibid
. , p . 216
.
^Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy , p. 118.
6Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), July 5,
1975.
7Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), June 28,
1975.
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ten times the level of 1954, the budget as a percentage of
GNP (table I) has steadily declined from a high of 1.7% in
1954 to .8% in 1973. Japanese Cabinets have supported a 1%
upper limit, although it is doubtful whether it will be pos-
sible to maintain the present trend without weakening the
SDF. The reason is that the phenomenonal Japanese economic
growth rate has been muted; no longer will the expanding de-
fense budget be outdistanced by an even greater increase in
GNP. For the SDF to continue to develop, or even modernize
the existing forces as new military technology is made avail-
able, a larger percentage of GNP will have to be devoted to
the military.
The defense expenditures as a percentage of the national
budget (table I) is another declining trend which may level
off or be reversed if the SDF continues to develop at the present
pace. These figures suggest that the military decisions of the
next few years will be economically as well as politically dif-
ficult ones. Assertions that Japan could build a major military
force, possibly even acquire nuclear weapons, while maintaining
the less than 1% of GNP defense budget are losing their validity.
A comparison of national military establishments reveals
that Japan's defense expenditure as a percentage of GNP is least
among major nations (Table II). The figures for three European
fisc
year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
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TABLE I
JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
1
Defense
Budget
:
($ million)
2
Defense
Budget
:
7o of GNP
3
Defense
Budget: 70
of national
Budget
4
GNP
($ billion)
375 1.73 21.7
375 1.52 - 24.6
397 1.44 - 27.6
399 1.28 - 31.2
412 1.26 10.9 32.7
432 1.14 9.0 37.8
444 .99 9.0 45.0
510 .92 9.0 55.1
594 .99 8.50 60.2
688 .97 8.05 71.0
780 .95 8.49 82.0
846 .94 8.24 90.7
959 .91 7.74 105.9
1075 .86 7.47 124.3
1172 .80 7.28 146.6
1375 .79 7.22 174.2
1640 .81 7.16 203.4
2252 .88 7 . 23 255.3
2601 .88 6 . 78b 285.7
3530a . 8a 6 . 55b -
3835a - - -
columns 1,2,4 Kunio Muroaka, Japanese Security and
column 3
the United States, Adelphi Papers No
95 (London: IISS, 1973), Table 1, p.
F.C. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy
(Vancouver: University
Columbia Press, 1973),
a IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975
of British
Table 6.1, p.
(London: IISS
1974), p. 79.
bJapan Report, November 16t, 1974, p. 6 •
34.
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TABLE II
COMPARATIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE FIGURES
4
Total
Defense Expenditure312 3 armedforces
as % 5
Country
1974 1973
$ million % of GNP
1973
$ per
capita
of men
of mili-
tary age^
Total
armed
^forces 0
Sweden 1641 3.1 211 5.5 86,100
Switzerland 884 1.7 122 - 42,500c
West Germany 13588 2.9 182 4.0 490,000
France 7913 3.1 162 4.9 502,500
Britain 8721 4.9 155 3.4 345,300
Czechoslovakia 1384 3.8 92 6.8 200,000
JAPAN 3835 .8 32 .9 233,000
Australia 1907 3.3 144 2.6 68,851
Indonesia 452 3.2 4 1.5 270,000
South Korea 558 3.8 14 - 625 , 000d
India 2443 3.1 4 .9 956,000
U.S.S.R. 33056 5.4 134 6.8 3,525,000
U.S. 85800 6.2 377 5.5 2,174,000
Israel 3688 47.8 1310 23.5 145,500
source: IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975 (London: IISS, 1974).
ap. 78-79.
kp. 82.
cp. 30.
^p. 56.
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countries (France, West Germany, and Sweden), for example, hover
around 3%, while for the East Asian examples of Australia, In-
donesia, and South Korea, the figure is 3.3%, 3.2%, and 8%
respectively. The per capita expenditure of defense funds
(table II) in the three selected European nations is between
five and six times the corresponding figure in Japan ($32.).
Australia spends $144 per capita while Indonesia spends only $4.
This statistic must be used in conjunction with total population.
For example, Australia, with a population of somewhat more than
one eighth the population of Indonesia, would have to spend far
more per capita to develop a similar military system.
Column 4 of table II suggests the commitment made to nation-
al defense, in the form of the percentage of men of military age
in the armed forces. Again, Japan has a very low percentage
(.9) compared with Sweden’s 5.5%, or West Germany's 4%. This
figure, and the total armed forces statistic (table II, column
5), do not reflect the all-important qualitative element, which
determines the effectiveness of a given military force. The
233,000 personnel of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces makes up
a more potent fighting potential than do the 270,000 people of
the Indonesian military, more than one- third of whom are involved
,
.
8
in administrative duties.
»The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Ike
Military Balance 1974-1975 (London: IISS, 1974), p. 54.
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Although Japan spends little relative to GNP in building
the defense force, in absolute terms the budget (table 110 is
the seventh largest in the world. Were Japan to raise the
budget level to only 2% of GNP, the military budget would sur-
pass the Europeans to become the third largest in the world. 9
Japan's military strength is far below its potential relative
to the size of the economy and the expertise of Japan's tech-
nology, but it can not be considered insignificant in any
absolute sense. It is also the consensus of most observers
that, given the advanced level of technology, Japan could
easily become a major military power in a number of years,
although the domestic political constraints are more signifi-
cant than the technical ones.
The present fighting potential of Japan's military forces,
however, is limited, especially in total mobilized strength.^
The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are 230,000 strong, but with
only 39,000 reserves and no national system of conscription.
Sweden can mobilize 750,000 troops, while Switzerland can call
625,000 within 48 hours. South Korea is a special case given
the constant threat at the demilitarized zone. However, there
^Swadesh R. DeRoy, "Prospects for Militarism in Japan,"
Pacific Community , V, No. 2 (1974), 300.
J-^The comparative military figures in this paragraph are
taken from IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975 , pp. 29-30,
55-57.
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are over 1 million reservists and a special 2 million member
\
local Militia Homeland Defense Reserve Force. In combat air-
craft Japan's combined Maritime and Air Force total of 495 is
less than twice the Swiss number (290)
,
but one-hundred less
than the number of Swedish combat aircraft (600). The Japanese
navy also has fewer submarines than Sweden (15 and 20, respec-
tively), although Japan is well ahead in submarine defense ves-
sels and destroyers.
In 1971 Defense Agency Director Nakasone listed four limi-
tations to the development of the defense forces: 1 ^ (1) Con-
stitutional limit (Article 9), (2) political limit (government
pledge not to obtain nuclear weapons), (3) operational limit
(defense of Japanese territory only), and (4) equipment limit
(offensive weapons prohibited). Continued enforcement of these
limitations will depend on the external environment and the
seriousness of perceived threats to Japanese security.
The Strategic Environment
The significance of the Japanese military is put in proper
perspective when set against the powerful forces based on the
12
Asian mainland and in the nearby waters of the Pacific. Al-
^Farnsworth
,
"Japan: The Year of the Shock," p. 53.
The comparative military figures in this paragraph are
taken from IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975 , pp. 8-10,
48-50, 74-75.
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though the Soviet Union has not yet deployed extensive army or
air force units on the Pacific coast, 45 army divisions and
one-fourth of the tactical Air Force are placed along the Sino-
Soviet border and could presumably be diverted eastward. The
Soviet air forces have 5350 combat aircraft. Of greater rele-
vance, however, is the Pacific fleet of the Soviet navy, which
includes some 100 submarines (40 nuclear) and 55 surface com-
bat ships.
Until the middle 1960's, defense planners in Japan viewed
the Soviet Union as the main threat to Japanese security. The
P.R.C. had not yet developed a military potential which could
have posed a danger. The easing of tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union has diminished the apprehension
about a Soviet Attack. Moscow has become a status quo power
by wishing to freeze existing boundaries with China and re-
fusing to reopen the territorial dispute with Japan. However,
the present period of relief from the danger of bipolar con-
frontation, tends to heighten the irritation of local discord.
The disagreement over the disputed Northern Territories is, if
anything, growing in intensity since both sides adamantly re-
fuse to alter their positions. The fact that some of the is-
lands in question are within sight of Hokkaido, and the constant
contact between the Soviet navy and Japanese fishermen in the
107
area, suggests that strategic planning in Japan will continue
to focus on the Soviet Union. Soviet air bases have been es-
tablished on the two larger islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri,
ensuring Soviet control of the islands and surrounding region.
^
Entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk can be restricted, and Soviet
naval vessels are guaranteed undisturbed passage into the
Pacific Ocean.
The Chinese navy maintains a low visibility in East Asia,
although it has grown substantially to a force of 230,000 per-
sonnel with more than 50 submarines and a naval air force of
600 combat aircraft. The navy, like the infantry-based army,
is designed for defense and is not equipped to carry out major
offensive operations. However, in manpower the navy is now the
third largest in the world,^ reflecting the concerns about the
large Soviet fleet in the Pacific. It has been argued that
with the transfer of major threats from a bipolar framework to
a regional subsystem, Japan's major security problem would shift
to China. ^ The u.S. presence in the Pacific, however, remains
firm, providing China with the assurance that Japan will not
feel the need to rearm. Also Tokyo's concerns about the Soviet
lbJames Simon, "Japan's 'Ostpolitik' and the Soviet Union,"
World Today , XXX, No. 4 (1974), 161-162.
l
^The New York Times , August 10, 1975.
l^Hellmann, "The Confrontation with 'Realpolitik
'
" , p.
144.
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Union during the cold war were not based solely on cold war
tensions, but on several bilateral difficulties mentioned
above
.
Although the Soviet Union is still more of a threat to
Japan than China, Japanese security policy will be affected
more directly by the dynamics of the major-power triangle in
East Asia, than by China or the Soviet Union individually.
The relationship of the three major powers in Asia, as dis-
cussed in chapter III, provides Japan with a certain measure
of security. However, it is a security which binds Japan to
external events. A disintegration in the environment could
effect a drastic change in Japan's security policy.
The most serious general security problem for Japan is the
danger of being drawn into a conflict on the Korean peninsula,
where the interests of all of the major powers in Asia overlap.
Once the communist forces in Indochina achieved complete suc-
cess, it was natural that tension would shift to Northeast
Asia, where the dilemma of a divided Korea remains unresolved.
Japan could not avoid becoming directly linked to hostilities
in Korea, especially since American forces stationed in South
Korea are there in support of the U.S. commitment to Japan as
well . 16
1(3The New York Times, May 23, 1975.
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A Korea unified under President Kim would present Japan
with a new communist neighbor. A victorious South would add
to Japan s insecurity as well, since a unified Korea would have
an armed force much larger than Japan's. Acceptance of the
status quo in Korea is the best alternative in terms of Japan's
security, since South Korea acts as a buffer between Japan and
China while reducing the military challenge from Korea. The
fact that Japan has granted de facto legitimacy to North Korea
through unofficial talks on trade and other matters, lends
credence to the idea that Japan would prefer to develop friendly
relations with both halves of a divided Korea.
When President Kim of North Korea travelled to Peking in
April 1975 for a state visit, he sought support for a return to
belligerency toward the South. Mr. Kim's opening speech out-
lined the chances for war.
If revolution takes place in South Korea, we,
as one and the same nation, will not just look
at it with folded arms but will strongly sup-
port the South Korean people. If the enemy
ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely
answer it with war and completely destroy the
aggressors .
^
However, the communique, while continuing general support for
the North Koreans, cautioned against resort to war to achieve
^Peking Review
,
XVIII, No. 17 (1975), 17.
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North Korean goals of reunification and elimination of American
forces from the Korean peninsula.
The Chinese side reaffirms its resolute sup-
port to the Korean people in their just strug-
gle for the independent and peaceful reunifi-
cation of their fatherland. 1 ^ [emphasis added]
It is unlikely that North Korea would instigate a new armed
conflict with the South without promises of support from China
or the Soviet Union. Yet, it is even more unlikely that either
communist neighbor would lend such support to President Kim,
for fear of damaging relations with the United States.
Three points should be noted regarding the external set-
ting of security policy. First, the security issue for Japan
is strictly a regional one. Unlike other aspects of Japanese
foreign policy, military policy is confined to East Asia,
especially Northeast Asia. Although there is some discussion
about the protection of shipping lines and guaranteeing pas-
sage through international straits, it would be folly for Japan
to attempt to solve these issues with military, rather than
diplomatic, policy.
Second, the external environment is characterized by the
lack of any serious threats to the security of Japan. China
and the Soviet Union are both attempting to woo Japan away from
ISpeking Review , XVIII, No. 18 (1975), 9.
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the other, while constraints have been placed on armed conflict
as a means of settling the Korean situation.
Third, Japan's armed forces are insignificant compared to
the military potential available to China and the Soviet Union.
This explains the emphasis placed on the U.S. military presence
in Northeast Asia and the security treaty with the United States.
The U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty
The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, a
revision of the 1951 Security Treaty, is the basis for the
American defense commitment to Japan. For Japan the advantages
of the treaty are obvious: a guarantee of security, a low de-
fense budget, and an East Asia reassured about Japanese motives,
because of the American military presence in Japan. In return,
the United States is permitted to have bases in Japan, not only
for the benefit of Japan, but to protect American interests in
East Asia.
There are no external developments at present which could
endanger Japan's defense as long as the security relationship
with the United States is in operation. Reliance on the treaty
has been a constant theme of foreign policy statements ema-
nating from Japan and a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
Problems associated with the treaty and the extent to which
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Japan continues to place faith in the security relationship
with the United States, will be important determinants of the
future direction of Japanese defense policy.
The 1951 Security Treaty was much different from the 1960
revision now in force. The belief by some Japanese that the
treaty was the price to be paid for the return of sovereignty,
and that it was a one-sided treaty, fueled the fierce opposi-
tion to the revision - and continuation - of the security tie
to the United States in 1960. The original treaty made no
specific U.S. commitment to guarantee the security of Japan.
Furthermore, Japan was given no voice in the deployment of U.S.
forces in Japan. Consultative mechanisms did not exist to deal
with other matters of American defense policy in Asia which
might affect Japan. According to the treaty, U.S. forces were
authorized to quell internal disturbances, and were required to
be stationed in Japan, factors which suggested to many a con-
tinuation of the occupation. Japan wanted the treaty to be
linked to the U.N. Charter and to reflect a more mutual approach
with duties and obligations falling to both sides. A further
difference of opinion surrounded the period the treaty would
remain in force. The 1951 treaty was to continue until both
governments agreed to terminate it, thus giving the United States
a right to station troops in Japan for an unlimited period of
time
.
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The revision in 1960 incorporated many of the Japanese
objections to the earlier treaty. The preamble and four of ten
articles refer specifically to principles and functions of the
United Nations, in the event of an "armed attack against either
19Party. As for the issue of mutual consultation, the title
of the treaty was changed from 'Security Treaty Between the
United States and Japan,' to 'Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security Between the United States and Japan. ' Article IV
called for the parties to "consult together from time to time
regarding the implementation of this treaty. The formation
of the Security Consultative Committee resulted from further
O 1
discussions about the mandate of Article IV, creating for the
first time a regular channel for the coordination of mutual
security problems. In addition, an exchange of notes accom-
panying the treaty stated that changes in deployment of U.S.
troops or the use of military bases "shall be the subjects of
„22
prior consultation with the government of Japan.
In the present treaty, U.S. forces are not required to be
stationed in Japan, and no longer does internal security fall
19"Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the
United States and Japan," in Hellmann, Japan and East Asia ,
Appendix B, p. 198.
20 lbid .
2lLangdon, Japan's Foreign Policy , p. 40..
22 MTreaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security," p. 200.
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within the jurisdiction of the United States. The U.S. defense
commitment is contained in Article V.
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack
against either Party in the territories under
the administration of Japan would be danger-
ous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional pro-
visions and processes. 23
Japan is required to respond only to an attack against Japanese
territory, thus remaining within the bounds set by the Con-
stitution, which, as interpreted by the Japanese, prohibits
forces for any purpose other than self-defense. In 1970, both
nations allowed the treaty to automatically extend itself,
bringing into force the new conditions for termination, as pro-
vided for in the treaty.
. . .
either Party may give notice to the
other Party of its intention to terminate
the treaty, in which case the treaty shall
terminate one year after such notice has
been given . 24-
Two aspects of the present treaty have been the objects of
lengthy debate: the 'Far East' clause and prior consultation.
At issue in the first is the areas to which U.S. forces may be
legally sent from bases in Japan for combat or other military
purpose. It is reasoned that U.S. troop activities may implicate
^ Ibid~ p"! 198.
24- ibid.
,
p . 199
.
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vj3.p3.ri. in situntions townrd which vJ3p3n would choose to remnin
neutrnl
.
J3p3n hss 3 legsl obligstion to 3id in U.S. defense ef-
forts only on Jnpnnese soil, 3nd never in violntion of the
Jnpnnese Constitution. The trenty, strictly spenking, is not
'mutunl ' 3S the title suggests. In return for unbnlnnced
obligntions
,
however, the trenty stipulntes thnt the United
St3tes mny use bnses in Jnpnn "for the purposes of contributing
to the security of Jnpnn 3nd the mnintennnce of pence nnd
25
security in the Fnr Enst.
.
." This nnd other clnuses of the
trenty, ns well ns the exchnnge of notes, presents n confusing
picture of the role of U.S. forces in Jnpnn nnd Enst As in,
which can be simplified to the following components:
1) The U.S. can renct immedintely nnd by force to a
direct thrent to Jnpnnese territory. (Article V)
2) The U.S. mny use bnses in Jnpnn to support improve-
ments in the pence nnd security of the Fnr Enst, of
n non-combnt nnture, without mnndntory consultntion
with Jnpnnese lenders. (Article VI)
3) As long ns they contribute to the mnintennnce of
pence nnd security in the Fnr Enst, the U.S. mny
engnge in support nctivities of n non-combnt nnture
outside of the Fnr Enst. (interpretntion of Article
VI)
4) For any combnt nctivities in the Fnr Enst, of U.S.
forces stntioned in Jnpnn, prior consultntion must
• j
^ Ibid p. 198.
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be carried out with the Japanese government, (from
the exchange of diplomatic notes at the time the
treaty was signed)
The scope of the 'Far East' is not determined by the treaty,
and inevitably interpretations vary.
It is in Japan's interests to limit the area within which
U.S. military actions may occur, in order to reduce the pos-
sibility of involvement in international disputes, which other-
wise would have no bearing on national security. Attempts to
define the scope of the Far East have proved unsuccessful.
The United States has generally held to a broader interpreta-
tion than Japan, although in March, 1960 the Japanese govern-
O £
ment declared that the scope of the Far East is vague. °
Vietnam is an example of a military action, supported in
part by the activities of U.S. bases in Japan, which did not
directly endanger the security of Japan. Because Japan was open
to charges of supporting the U.S. war effort, Japan's Foreign
Minister said, in 1967, that his country was "not neutral in the
Vietnam war."27 U.S. involvement in controversial military ac-
tions originating from bases in Japan could endanger the Japanese
policy of maintaining good relations with all countries and lead
^byoung C. Kim, "Japan's Security Policy Debate," in Japan
in World Politics , ed. by Young C. Kim (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Asian Studies, 1972), p. 63.
^ 7 Ibid.
,
p . 66
.
117
to a search for alternative methods of defense. A key to future
Japanese defense policy will be the degree to which the U.S. use
of the Security Treaty is sensitive to Japanese interests.
The prior consultation principle established in Article
IV, and confirmed in the subsequent exchange of notes, was
designed to protect Japanese sovereignty in the cases of major
changes in the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan or combat
operations using Japan-based forces. The exchange of notes,
which specified the circumstances when consultation is neces-
28
sary, is considered to carry the force of international law.
However, the use of the word ’consultation' instead of a stronger
word such as ’agreement' suggests the limited value of the clause
in actually ensuring Japanese control of combat operations
originating from within its boundaries. In fact, in the fifteen
years of its existence, during the period of U.S. involvement in
Indochina, the clause has not been invoked once.^
Although Japan fears being drawn into a conflict not its
own, there is also apprehension that the American defense com-
mitment has weakened. The U.S. withdrawal of all forces from
Cambodia and Vietnam and unwillingness to offer more support in
the face of sure defeat, affected the Japanese faith in the
^^ Ibid
., p. 67.
29xhe New York Times, October 27, 1974.
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security treaty. Criticism of the U.S. role in Indochina was
instantly changed to shock that the U.S. would no longer defend
the nations it had made commitments to. The analogy to Japan's
case was obvious, although Japan represents a more fundamental
interest to the U.S. than Vietnam ever did. Nonetheless, even
before the fall of Saigon, Japanese officials were preparing
to ask Washington for a new commitment to Japan's defense. 30
The role of American public opinion in tempering the Viet-
nam policy was also an indication to Japan that even firm
promises by the U.S. Government might not be upheld in a time
of crisis. A Gallup pole taken in 1971 and again in the spring
of 1975 indicates that there has not been a swing toward iso-
lationism during the past few years. 3 ^ However, Japan can take
little comfort from the finding that if Japan were attacked
only 16% of the sample would advise sending more troops to Japan.
Article V of the Security Treaty, which deals with the
heart of the American commitment to protect Japanese territory
from attack, specifies that each Party would act "in accordance
with its constitutional provisions and processes." The 'pro-
cesses' refer to the Congressional role in the declaration of
of war. Considering the Congress' reassertion of its war-
b^The New Yorir~Times , April 4, 1975.
3 ^-The New York Times
,
May 11, 1975.
32"Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security," p. 198.
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related powers and the newly established congressional limi-
tations on a president's ability to wage war, it is natural for
Japan to wonder whether the United States could act swiftly and
decisively in the event of an attack on Japan.
The recognition of this concern has led to an American
effort to reassure its Asian allies, especially Japan and South
Korea, that the United States is to be trusted. Secretary of
State Kissinger told the Japan Society that
we will permit no question to arise about
the firmness of our treaty commitments;
allies who seek our support will find us
constant . ^3
A month later, in August 1975, a Prime Minister Miki-President
Ford summit meeting in Washington dealt primarily with the U.S.
role in Northeast Asia and the security treaty. A joint an-
nouncement to the press'3
*4 noted, among other things: (1) the
United States would uphold its treaty commitments in Asia, (2)
the security treaty is an "indispensable element" of Asian
international politics, and (3) the United States will continue
to uphold the defense commitment to Japan. Although the United
States has improved its credibility, U.S. actions will weigh
heavily on the evolution of Japanese defense policy. If the
bbjapan House "Newsletter , XXIII, No. 1 (1975), 4.
34japan Times Weekly (International Edition), August 16,
1975.
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United States were to pull away from its defense commitment,
n military isolation - or the separation from the assurance of
a proper defense - could trigger a decision to rearm in force.
The conditions at the time the 1960 Security Treaty was
drafted no longer exist. The Japanese themselves are more
self-confident and willing to deal with national problems
independently. The idea of once again revising the treaty,
to more accurately reflect the prevailing conditions of 1975,
has taken root. Prime Minister Miki has already outlined his
broader interpretation of the treaty.
The Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security is, as its name evidences, the
basic charter governing cooperative relations
between the two countries. Hitherto, the
defense aspect of the treaty has tended to
come to the fore, but it is to be welcomed
that today, when the energy and food problems
have assumed such importance, mutual recog-
nition has developed between the two countries
of its proper and natural significance as a
balanced treaty providing both for economic
and other cooperation on the one hand and
defense and security on the other.
The necessity and importance of the treaty in stabilizing
the East Asian area and securing the defense of Japan is recog-
nized by both Japan and the United States. However, statements
such as the above suggest the direction in which interpretation
55japan Report
,
"Policy Speech by Prime Minister Takeo
Miki," March 1, 1975 (special supplement), p. 2.
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of the treaty is directed. Revision of the treaty in the next
decade to indicate more formally such sentiments is a distinct
possibility.
Nuclear Weapons and the NPT
The security treaty with the United States and Japan's
nuclear option are linked issues. If Japan continues to reject
nuclear armament, there will have to be adequate assurances
from the United States that the treaty is meaningful and that
the U.S. deterrent is operative. The need for the U.S. deter-
rent is still widely recognized in Japan,^ although it is more
frequently doubted than before. The question of whether the
United States would give up New York and Chicago for Tokyo and
Osaka is an oversimplification of the problem, but it does sug-
gest the concerns of a nation completely dependent upon another
for ultimate security.
Could Japan establish its own nuclear deterrent? There
are few proponents of such a policy at the present time, although
the desire for an autonomous defense not dependent on the deci-
sions of Americans could lead to more serious planning for this
option. If Japan set up a deterrent, at least a potential
enemy would have to count on nuclear weapons being used in the
3b See Prime Minister Miki's comments on this subject in
Ibid
.
,
p . 4.
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event of an attack, whereas now an enemy could gamble that the
U.S. would not respond with nuclear weapons. A further rationale
for nuclear weapons is international prestige. The unfortunate
fact that the permanent members of the Security Council of the
United Nations are all nuclear nations is not unknown in Japan.
The previous line of reasoning has serious weaknesses.
From the standpoint of security, nuclear weapons simply would not
offer any advantages. It is difficult to conceive of Japan set-
ting up an operative deterrent, given the geographical and demo-
graphic facts of the Japanese islands. Japan is the sixth most
populous country and ranks third in the size of the economy.
However, most of the large industrial complexes and nearly one-
half the population are located in an area between Tokyo and
Osaka, which are only 300 miles apart. To defend effectively
this region from nuclear attack, regardless of the sophistica-
tion of the technology used, would be impossible.
The technological aspects of developing nuclear weapons are
not insurmountable for a nation of Japan’s advanced development.
Japan became the fourth nation to orbit a satellite, although
the more difficult problems of guidance systems have yet to be
overcome. Japan is completely dependent upon the import of
uranium, which comes from Canada, the U.S., Australia, and France.
A potential nuclear power would have to have guaranteed supplies
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of the materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Japan
also lacks areas to test weapons. Testing in the Pacific would
be prohibitive in diplomatic cost.
The legality of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes has
been established, surprisingly enough, by government documents
and official statements. In 1967 Prime Minister Sato claimed
that defensive nuclear weapons would be legal. 37 phe 1970
Defense White Paper, although reaffirming the policy of keeping
nuclear weapons out of Japan for the present, did confirm their
legality.
. . . In the legal and theoretical sense, pos-
session of small nuclear weapons, falling
within the minimum requirement for a capacity
necessary for self-defense and not posing a
threat of aggression to other countries, would
be permissible.
.
.38
Japan's nuclear policy contains the following components.
(1) Japan continues to rely on the American deterrent, which
was confirmed in the August summit talks between Miki and
Ford. 39 The present nuclear policy, therefore, is that "going
nuclear is totally out of the question."^0 (2) Although Japan
J/Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy , p. 139.
38Kunio Muraoka, Japanese Security and the United States ,
Adelphi Papers No. 95 (London: IISS, 1973), p. 24.
39japan Report , "Japan-U.S. Announcement to the Press,"
September 1, 1975, p. 2.
4-Qjapan Report
,
"Policy Speech by Prime Minister Mimi,"
p . 4.
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continues to base its defense on the U.S. military alliance,
the option to develop nuclear weapons remains open. (3) Prime
Minister Miki claims to uphold the "three no" nuclear policy of
no manufacture, no possession, and no entry of nuclear weapons.
(4) Japan continues to maintain a strong program of domestic
nuclear power production and has begun to manufacture nuclear-
powered ships.
These elements of nuclear policy suggest no long-term
commitment to a single policy, but rather an interest in
keeping options open while professing no willingness at the
present time to alter the three no-nuclear principle.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed by Japan
in 1970 but not yet ratified, has taken on special importance
as the focus of Japan's nuclear decision. Since Japan is an
important threshold state, able but not willing to manufacture
nuclear weapons and delivery systems, many nations, especially
those in Southeast Asia, China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
consider Japan's final action regarding the NPT to be a test
of the seriousness of the often repeated non-nuclear principles.
Becoming a party to the treaty is more of a symbol of non-
nuclear status than a permanent limitation of defense options.
Article 10 of the treaty stipulates that:
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Each Party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this
treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. 1
Even so Japan has withheld ratification of the treaty pending
the resolution of several areas of concern to the Japanese
government
.
A Japanese statement issued at the signing of the NPT
elaborated the type of progress which would have to precede
final approval. Although the treaty was designed to be a first
step to general nuclear disarmament, Japan is still concerned
that the present nuclear powers might use the NPT as a means of
consolidating their monopoly of nuclear weapons, without making
real efforts to stop the arms race. A related concern is the
security of non-nuclear states. Japan emphasized that if the
NPT were to have any effectiveness, the use of nuclear weapons
to threaten non-nuclear states must be dealt with. The United
Nations Security Council Resolution 355, proposed by the three
nuclear-weapon nations who are parties to the NPT (U.S.,
Britain, U.S.S.R.) as a safeguard to non-nuclear nations, was
, ,
.
.42
acknowledged by Japan as a step in the right direction.
4i"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July
1, 1968," in Hellmann, Japan and East Asia , Appendix D. p. 211.
42japan Times Weekly (International Edition), March 22,
1975.
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Another problem is the freedom to develop the peaceful
uses of nuclear power. Article 3 of the NPT calls for non-
nuclear weapon nations who become parties to the treaty to be
subject to inspection safeguards by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, to ensure the peaceful nature of nuclear power
programs. Japan is worried that the inspection arrangement
subject the nation s nuclear power program to unfair treat-
ment and that commercial secrets would be compromised by IAEA
43inspectors. Progress has been made on this issue, since,
in March 1975, Japan reached agreement with the IAEA on all
outstanding issues of inspection.
The Japanese decision on ratification of the NPT will also
be influenced by the decisions of other nations. Japan would
feel less compulsion to become party to the treaty if other
nations most likely to develop nuclear weapons refused to take
part. Of the fourteen nations considered threshold nuclear
powers,^ eight are non- signatories (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, and Spain), four are
43 shelton L. Wil 1 iams
,
Nuclear Nonproliferation in Inter-
national Politics: The Japanese Case
,
The Social Science
Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Mono-
graph Series in World Affairs, IX, No. 3 (Denver: University
of Denver, 1972), p. 40.
^John Maddox, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation ,
Adelphi Papers No. 113 (London: IISS, 1975), pp. 34-35.
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signatories but have not yet ratified (Egypt, Indonesia, South
Korea, and Japan), and only two (Iran and Taiwan) are full
parties to the NPT
. Since inclusion of the nations which could
develop nuclear weapons is the object of the NPT, the treaty
has not been effective.
In May 1974 India, a non-signatory nation, became the sixth
nation to explode a nuclear device. An immediate Japanese pro-
test expressed regret because we have been and are still against
any nuclear test by any nation for any reason."^ The Indian
nuclear explosion was certainly a setback for the NPT and will
be a factor in Japanese ratification. A further concern is that
France and China, both nuclear powers, declined to sign the
treaty.
Those who oppose ratification of the NPT cite the India
example as a reason for the futility of staying out of the
nuclear game. It is argued that for Japan to foreclose its
right to develop nuclear weapons would be foolish, especially
given the important place in international affairs which Japan
now holds. A leading proponent of the realist approach to
Japan’s international relations, reasons that nuclear weapons
will accompany the inevitable coming of age of a Japanese foreign
policy forced to face ’Realpolitik ’ squarely.". . . The posses-
4-^The New York~Times, May 5, 1974.
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s ion of nuclear capabilities seems destined, to be a necessary
component for full and independent participation in inter-
national affairs. M<^
There are, however, advantages in remaining outside of
the nuclear club. Japan is now the object of close attention
by many nations having an interest in Japan's continued 'inno-
cence'. A type of reverse deterrence provides Japan with a
weapon, for the decision to rearm is always available. It
has been suggested that continued reluctance to ratify the NPT
is calculated to influence the nuclear policies of other
countries .
^
A similar idea, "the power of holding back,"^
means that the threat of becoming a nuclear power can be turned
into an asset.
For Japan, the national goal of international prestige
can be realized without nuclear weapons, whereas the shock of
a militarily powerful Japan would be destabilizing to the
East Asian region and would work against the very purpose of
acquiring them. Japan has a unique opportunity to achieve the
international prestige it seeks without the accoutrements of
former major powers. What has been denounced as international
idealism is for Japan the most realistic means of achieving her
4-bpellmann
,
Japan and East Asia , p. 183.
47Richard Ellingworth, Japanese Economic Policies and
Security
,
Adelphi Papers No. 90 (London: IISS, 1972), p. 26.
^^Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, p. 45.
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aims. This also suggests the uniqueness of Japan's present
position. A combination of geography, history, economics and
culture presents Japan with an opportunity to be the 'great
experiment' in international politics. The need to remain
friendly with 3.11 nations contributes to the realistic nature
of the option open to Japan. The refusal to build the symbols
of international manhood, and instead to support international
cooperation, makes abundant sense given Japan's relationship
to the international system. While addressing the United
Nations General Assembly in 1973, the Japanese Foreign Minister
pointed to the increasing weight of "deterrence by international
cooperation."^ This is the only kind of deterrence which makes
sense for Japan.
This is not to suggest that Japan will ignore the age-old
dictates of power politics. The possibility of Japan going
nuclear "even if it doesn't make sense"^ is an indication of
the complex forces at work on the question of nuclear weapons.
The point here, however, is that on the basis of the external
setting - the continued reliance on the United States, the lack
of serious threats, the intense reaction which Japanese nuclear
49Japan Report
,
"Excerpts from Statement by Masayoshi
Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Before U.N. General Assembly,"
October 16, 1973, p. 4.
50Emmerson, Arms
,
Yen & Power
,
p. 350.
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weapons would provoke, and the unique need to deal with all
nations - a non-nuclear Japan in a world of nuclear powers is
a realistic option for an emerging Japanese foreign policy.
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CHAPTER VI
DEFINING A WORLD ROLE: THE LIMITS OF CHOICE
The Tanaka Foreign Policy
According to most analysts of Japanese foreign policy, the
decade of the 1970‘s was to be the period when Japan would de-
velop a new role in world politics more suited to its enhanced
position in a changing international system. As the second
half of the decade begins, however, no clear pattern has emerged,
and Japan has yet to formulate a comprehensive set of principles
and policies establishing a basis for future relations with the
world. The foreign policy during the Tanaka prime ministership
substantiates this observation.
Tanaka came to power at a time of increased flexibility in
international relations and strong domestic support for a shift
in foreign policy. The Japanese Prime Minister initiated the
first ‘positivist''*' foreign policy in the post-war era, engaging
in eight major summit conference trips - talking with the lead-
iFor background on the 'positivism-passivism' foreign policy
debate in Japan, see Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan's Dilemma: To Act or
Not to Act," Foreign Policy , No. 16 (Fall 1974), 30-47.
2(1) U.S.- September 1972, (2) P .R. C . -September 1972, (3)
U.S. -August 1973, (4) West Germany, Britain, and France-October
1973, (5) U.S.S.R. -October 1973, (6) ASEAN- January 1974, (7)
Canada, Mexico, Brazil- September 1974, (8) Burma, New Zealand,
Austral ia-November 1974.
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ers of seventeen nations - in slightly more than two years.
His major foreign policy accomplishment was the normalization
of diplomatic relations with China.
Japanese foreign policy during this period, however, was
infrequently successful and often counterproductive. Goals
that were set for the new diplomacy - development of a tri-
lateral relationship with the United States and Europe, im-
provement of relations with Southeast Asia, and conclusion of
a treaty with the Soviet Union - made little progress. Tanaka
was met with indifference in Europe, intransigence in Moscow,
and riots in Southeast Asia, leaving relations with the latter
area at a post-war low. The trip to the western hemisphere in
September, 1974 uncovered a growing Canadian skepticism of
Japanese economic policy and its fear of becoming "the new
3
Manchuria." The summit talks in Washington have been unevent-
ful, although relations have improved since the 1971 series of
economic and diplomatic 'shocks', which rocked the Japanese-
American friendship. No major proposals for Japanese partici-
pation in global affairs were discussed beyond hollow asser-
tions of partnership. The tendency of Japanese policy to bend
under pressure was not altered by the appearance of a more
active foreign policy, as evidenced by the negotiations with
3fhe New York Times, September 29, 1974.
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China for an aviation agreement, the inclusion of the 'hegemony'
clause in the 1972 Joint Statement, and the reversed Middle East
policy. The Tanaka foreign policy showed no signs of being able
to stand firm in the midst of political confrontation with other
nations
.
Although the Tanaka foreign policy marked a shift to a new
activism, the diplomatic efforts lacked an underlying foundation
other than 'resources diplomacy, ' a phrase particularly galling
to resource-holding nations. Tanaka never defined the basis of
support for Japan's ventures into world politics and soon found
out that concrete results were not easily obtained. The newly
active diplomacy created confusion in the world and disappoint-
ment at home. It was piecemeal, designed to cure specific
problems as they arose; it reflected no international philosophy.
Resources diplomacy alone could not create a stable basis
on which Japan could enter the world more actively. The obser-
vation that "economic power has become, in the eyes of the
world, political power"^ suggests that Japan must recognize the
larger political impact of economic negotiations. Politics and
economics can no longer be separated.
9-Riichi Aichi, "Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change,"
Foreign Affairs , XLVIII, No. 1 (1969), 30.
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Japan's foreign policy continues to be reactive, shaped
by external events and the changing international environment.
The positivist diplomatic stance of recent years does not mean
that Japan was any less dependent upon outside constraints or
any more able to carry out an independent foreign policy.
Even the Tanaka summit diplomacy was triggered originally by
two external events - the Nixon trip to Peking and the oil
crisis
.
The Tanaka foreign policy indicates that the process of
defining a new Japanese position in international relations
has made little progress. International politics remain in
flux. New problems affecting the whole world - rich and poor -
defy solution, and the aftermath of old problems, such as
Indochina, only adds uncertainty to what is to come. Under
these circumstances Japan is reluctant - and finds it very dif-
ficult - to develop a new and comprehensive approach to guide
its foreign policy, especially since this approach will be
shaped more by the international system which emerges than
vice versa .
Japan in World Politics
Japan fits none of the standard molds used to categorize
nations. The limitations upon Japan's acquiring the status of
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superpower, polar power, or regional power were described in
earlier chapters. Neutrality is also ruled out by Japan's
interaction with its surroundings. Japan is affected by and
affects other nations to such a degree that a politically
responsible foreign policy is necessary to balance the exten-
sive economic interdependence with the rest of the world. The
dilemma of Japanese foreign policy is to find a position which
assimilates both the need to maintain a relatively low profile,
in light of extreme economic and military vulnerability, and
the need to deal constructively with issues which demand
definite political choices, such as development aid strategies
for developing nations. Japan must avoid both abrasive policy
on the one hand and an irresponsible lack of policy on the other.
Two general observations concerning Japan's place in world
politics serve to narrow further the range of foreign policy
choice. The first is that Japan's relationship to the inter-
national system is unique, consisting of a combination of
factors unprecedented in world politics. The implication is
that a new pattern of international activity, replacing the
standard models listed above, is required to accommodate a
future international role for Japan.
The imbalance between the extensive economic position in
the world and negligible military significance is the basis of
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Japan's uniqueness. Other nations have avoided a military
role, but never has a nation of such importance to the world,
in this case a nation with the third largest economy, not
chosen to develop corresponding political and military power.
Furthermore, this economic giant can be hurt by the decisions
of any number of resource-holding nations.
Japan has entered the world on a massive scale, but is
ill-equipped to fulfill the accompanying responsibilities on
the basis of customary notions of power. The 'great experiment'
to develop as an economic power without the traditional sources
of military power suggests an irregular pattern of interna-
tional activity. This paper concludes that the 'great experi-
ment' is not only plausible, but that Japan would meet powerful
constraints by attempting to act as a traditional world power.
The unique nature of Japan's position in world politics is
also evident in the second general observation, namely, that
Japan is a nation without any consistent source of diplomatic
support, even the U.S., and therefore is in an isolated posi-
tion in international politics as well. This is the fundamental
dilemma of Japanese foreign policy. It stems from the impera-
tives of the economy which direct Japan to promote an 'unprin-
cipled' foreign policy, more practical than ideological, the
core of which is the separation of politics from economics. A
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Foreign Ministry White Paper written during the Sato prime
ministership recognized that Japan had little choice but to
promote, first, its relations with all other countries so as
to enable it to conduct a dialogue with any of them."~^ The
succeeding administration continued to voice this policy in
the form of what Foreign Minister Miyazawa calls 'diversified
diplomacy', "aimed at strengthening its friendly relations with
other countries of the world, including those with different
fl
political systems."
The policy of friendship with all nations, however, pre-
cludes the development of close relations with one group. For
example, Japan backed away from participation in ASPAC as soon
as it became evident that the regional organization was de-
signed to confront the People's Republic of China. Japan must
cultivate the broad spectrum of diplomatic relations rather
than participate in more limited groups of nations, with simi-
lar interests and common international goals, from which diplo-
matic support could be derived. Japan has many acquaintances
but no partners.
3Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers ,
p . 35
.
6Japan Report , "Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa," March 1, 1975 (special supplement), p. 5.
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Although Japan purposely diversifies her relations, there
is a danger of being among all the major groups in the world
and a member of none. This problem stems from Japan's middle
position between North and South, and East and West. In South-
east Asia, Japan is linked with a Western group of industri-
alized nations; in Western Europe, Japan is a threatening
Asian power. Japan has no natural position in a region, eco-
nomic group, or ideological association. In fact, Japan has
no natural ally. The notion of a Japan in a middle position
helps to explain present policies and future possibilities.
For a middle -man there is always the question
of identity - whom do you want to identify
with, what do you want to be, and what do you
want to achieve? To handle such problems,
middle-men start developing a life style and
way of looking at the world which may be built
on things like unsecurity and anxiety, trying
to do one's best within a given situation, and
trying to take low postures, because one of the
things that middle-men don't want to be is
visible .
7
Japan is a nation apart and therefore visible. Japan will have
to consider ways of integrating the nation's economic needs
with the interests of other nations in order to play a con-
structive part in international affairs. Diversified diplomacy
/United States Trade Council, Communication: The Key to
U.S.-Japan Understanding, a symposium for the International
Business Communities of the Western United States (Washington,
D.C.: The United States-Japan Trade Council, 1973), p. 6.
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is necessary to guarantee the continued health of the economy.
It becomes dangerous, however, if carried out without a broader
pattern of consensus among nations, and without an expanded
Japanese world-view, no longer restricted to economic matters.
Internationalism
Japan does not face the same diplomatic dangers when
working within international organizations. International
forums cannot create a favorable atmosphere in which the
divisions of the world at large do not appear. The voting
blocks in the General Assembly of the United Nations reflect
the North- South cleavage, which must also be faced in a bi-
lateral context. However, a multilateral format offers Japan
the opportunity to think and act globally - which it must -
without being a true global power, which it cannot be. Since
Japan has a vital interest in a stable world political system,
international organization and a more general philosophy of
internationalism offer the best opportunity to work for that
goal. Peace for Japan is synonymous with peace in the world.
By taking major diplomatic initiatives in a multilateral
context, Japan can avoid the pitfalls of her isolated position
and take advantage of its unusual middle—man role. By linking
an international posture to a multilateral approach, Japan can
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afford to play a positive part in finding the solutions to
global problems, with a minimum danger to its diversified
relations, and with insulation from bilateral political rival-
ries. Furthermore, the problems Japan is most concerned about
can no longer be solved through bilateral diplomacy. The
global economic structure, energy, trade, and disarmament, for
example, are of a technical nature and require the participa-
tion of many nations to negotiate fundamental solutions. Japan
has already established its effectiveness in multilateral
negotiations and has a successful history of participation in
international organizations.
Cooperation in supporting and strengthening the United
Nations has been a constant theme of Japanese foreign policy.
In 1973 $10 million was donated to lower the UN deficit, as
Q
well as $100 million for the United Nations University Fund.
The UN subsequently decided to accept Japan's offer to place
the headquarters of the United Nations University in Japan.
Since the UN is the only international organization which is
global, general-purpose, and neutral, the extent to which Japan
is able to play a leading role in its functions - perhaps as a
permanent member of the Security Council - will affect the
«Kei Wakaizumi, "Tanaka's Approach to Summit Diplomacy,"
Pacific Community, V, No. 2 (1974), 285-86.
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extent to which internationalism becomes a salient feature of
Japan's foreign policy.
An international organization, however, is a forum, not
a philosophy. It offers a framework for negotiation and co-
operation, but does not determine national policy. Also the
pursuit of a foreign policy based on a set of principles of
international cooperation cannot be successful by relying solely
on an international organization like the UN. On the contrary,
the success of a national policy of internationalism lies in a
particular relationship between a nation and its external con-
text, such that the policy of internationalism is conducive
to the achievement of national goals. Japan's unique position
in international society demonstrates convincingly that inter-
nationalism would not be a fanciful diplomatic gesture, but a
pragmatic approach to the requisites of domestic and foreign
policy.
The world role Japan chooses is bounded by the extent of
its compatibility with basic principles of international co-
operation. For Japan, internationalism would not represent a
shirking of the political responsibilities bom of economic
power, but would provide an opportunity to define political
goals clearly for the world to understand. On the basis of
the external foreign policy setting, Japan has the option of
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turning more seriously toward internationalism and becoming a
new type of world leader whose diplomatic base is the councils
of the world, whose diplomatic credo is diversity tempered by
interdependence, and whose international role as diplomatic
broker would generate its own political currency.
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